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INTRODUCTION
When Barbie and Ken divorce, they probably think about who gets their
dream home, how they will share custody of their children, and how they will move
forward with their lives. They may not have the time, energy, or knowledge for
tax planning. Despite this reality, Congress has created a tax system that expects
couples to engage in tax planning as they divorce. Congress encourages tax planning
because it decided that divorce is a time when taxpayers should be given flexibility
to determine who owes tax on the dissolved couple's income.' If divorcing couples
engage in this planning, some couples may minimize their collective taxes. But this
opportunity is only available for couples with children or an unequal division of
assets and earnings. And those couples must make tax efficient property transfers
and support payments.2 Thus, divorce as a tax-planning event is a targeted tax
reduction that, through its operation, creates tax winners and losers.
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rotra, Ted Seto, Nancy Shurtz, participants at the 2014 Law and Society Conference, and par-
ticipants at the 2014 Indiana Journal of Law & Social Equality Symposium, especially our
wonderful hosts at the Maurer School of Law at Indiana University. Finally, this project could
not have been completed without the financial assistance of the Harold C. Schott Foundation.
1. See infra Part I.
2. Divorce mitigates the marriage penalty that spouses with relatively equal earnings paid
when married, which is certainly a financial benefit, but not the same as the extension of tax
benefits discussed in this Article.
Despite the fact that some couples may enjoy significant tax savings
following divorce, federal taxation has little to do with what most people think of
when they think of divorce. Attitudes towards big-picture questions, such as why
do so many marriages end in divorce or whether spouses owe each other anything
after marriage, often color our views of what is an unrelated question: How should
the government tax payments following divorce? Family law objectives differ from
tax law principles and should be recognized as different. The question with respect
to taxation is whether Congress should reduce the taxes of divorcing couples and, if
so, how should the reduction be distributed between spouses? It is the latter question
that is the focus of this Article.
Reframing the question as a comparison of divorcing couples against other
taxpayers, and not simply as between spouses, produces a more equitable tax
system. To justify a targeted tax reduction upon divorce, there must be a reason this
group receives special government aid. Consequently, the aid should be targeted
to accomplishing that objective. Divorce is a difficult time financially for many
couples, so it may be appropriate to extend tax relief to at least some divorcing
couples.3 As a form of tax relief, and not an essential component of the tax system,
any tax reduction upon divorce must be equitable both between spouses and among
taxpayers generally.
Existing tax relief for some, but not all, divorcing couples is problematic.
If there is something special about divorce that deserves a tax break, every couple,
or at least couples in financial need, should enjoy tax reduction upon divorce. That
does not currently happen. Under current law, tax reduction is not tied to need but
to the tax planning and relative tax positions of the divorcing spouses.
Additionally, current law's tax reduction (as compared to prior law) is of the
couple's collective taxes. Through shifting the taxation of income from the payer of
property and support to the recipient, the payer owes less in tax while the recipient
owes more. If the recipient is in a lower tax bracket than the payer, this can result
in lower collective taxes. Importantly, the structure of the savings is that the payer
enjoys all of the tax reduction unless the recipient negotiates for a larger pre-tax
amount. The wealthier spouse may capture the tax reduction under existing law,
leaving the recipient worse off under the existing form of tax reduction.
Because of who are generally payers and recipients of divorce-related
payments, divorce-related taxation carries with it issues of class and gender.
Existing law increases the tax on recipient spouses and gives tax reduction to the
payer spouse with a goal of leaving more for the spouses to negotiate over. This
backhand way of helping couples in divorce does nothing for those spouses who
are truly poor and leaving poor marriages. In the conflict between class and gender,
relatively well-off women recipients may benefit from existing law, but low-income
wives from low-income marriages do not. This Article argues that this class-based
result is a bad form of the intended tax benefit.
3. See infra note 95.
In other contexts, scholars debate whether Congress should address
nonrevenue objectives through the tax code.4 When the focus of the tax provision
appears evident, such as healthcare penalties and green energy credits, one can
question whether the objective is good, whether the IRS should administer the
program, or whether the provision promotes the desired change in behavior. This
Article furthers this research agenda by examining a case in which interested groups
misinterpret Congress's limited objectives for targeted tax reduction.5 In this case
of limited congressional objectives (tax reduction) but broader societal objectives
(helping divorcing spouses and children of divorce), this Article questions whether
these other nonrevenue objectives are furthered by the targeted tax reduction.
Part II of this Article examines three sets of complex tax rules for divorcing
couples: (1) on transfers between former spouses; (2) on payments of child support;
and (3) with tax rates, deductions, and credits associated with divorcing couples'
children. Part III examines the premises of existing divorce-related tax provisions.
Divorce-related tax provisions shift the tax burden for income from payer spouses
to recipient spouses. This shifting of tax burdens may-or may not-reduce a
couple's collective taxes depending upon their relative tax positions, but it can also
produce higher collective tax burdens. And in an era when the law is recognizing
a growing number of relationships and the percentage of the population that is
legally married is declining, the existence of a tax preference for this group is
less justifiable. Although other relationships may end, only with divorce can its
members enjoy this targeted tax reduction.
To the extent Congress continues to recognize divorce as a time-deserving
tax reduction (not necessarily the best result, as discussed in Part III), an improved
form of aid for divorcing couples can be created. This Article proposes targeted
tax reduction to lower-income divorced spouses, instead of the existing regime
benefiting the wealthier spouse. In place of existing tax-shifting, nonrecognition
of appreciation on property transfers, and transferability of child-based benefits,
tax reduction should be focused on the spouse in financial need relative to other
4. This debate is almost as old as the tax system. See Victor Thuronyi, Tax Expenditures: A
Reassessment, 1988 DuKE L.J. 1155 (1988); Edward A. Zelinsky, James Madison and Public
Choice at Gucci Gulch: A Procedural Defense of Tax Expenditures and Tax Institutions, 102
YALE L.J. 1165 (1993). Compare Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implement-
ing Government Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARV. L.
REv. 705 (1970) (arguing "that the tax incentive is generally inferior to the direct subsidy as
a means of achieving social goals"), with Boris I. Bittker, A "Comprehensive Tax Base" as a
Goal ofIncome Tax Reform, 80 HARv. L. REv. 925 (1967) (contending "that neutral, scientific
measure of taxable income is a mirage").
5. E.g., WALTER WADLINGTON & RAYMoND C. O'BRIEN, FAMILY LAW IN PERSPECTIVE 107
(2001); Stacia Gawronski, Spousal Support Under the Internal Revenue Code, 20 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 63 (2012); Carole Gould, Simplifying the Nation Divorce Laws, N.Y TIMES
(May 19, 1985), http://www.nytimes.com/1985/05/19/business/personal-finance-simplifying-
the-nation-s-divorce-laws.html.
taxpayers. Therefore, for a period of time following divorce, low-income divorcing
spouses should receive a tax credit to help them transition to their non-marital
status. Transferors of property, which the transferors owned and controlled before
the divorce, should owe tax on any appreciation of that property as of the divorce,
but payable over a period of time. This prevents the recipient spouse from owing
tax on appreciation the payer enjoyed. Finally, child-based tax benefits should no
longer be viewed as property, but as a means to aid the child, and should therefore
be tied to custody of the child. Treating divorced spouses as separate taxpayers as
this proposal does, rather than extending favorable marriage treatment to them,
creates simpler rules that are more likely to help lower-income spouses and the
children of divorce.
This examination of divorce-related taxation emphasizes the importance of
narrowly tailoring tax policies to broader, nonrevenue goals as opposed to viewing
tax reduction as an end in itself. If we want to reduce social and economic inequality,
as is the focus of this Symposium, this Article concludes that tax reduction is not
a valid substitute for measuring whether the law accomplishes these nonrevenue
policy objectives.
I. CURRENT LAW
Divorce-related tax provisions are currently scattered throughout the
Internal Revenue Code ("the Code") because divorce produces many different
types of taxable transactions. These transactions have been taxed in many different
ways in the past. Currently, Congress mitigates most taxes upon divorce. In fact,
Congress has structured many of the tax provisions so that divorcing couples can
minimize their collective taxes. By allowing couples to have the lower-income
spouse pay tax on income or to transfer tax benefits to the higher-income spouse,
more income stays in the higher-income spouse's hands as opposed to going to the
government. Nothing in the Code ensures a redistribution of any of the tax savings
to the lower-income spouse.
There are three main types of divorce-related tax provisions. First, divorcing
couples may divide accumulated property, make future payments to divide marital
property, compensate a spouse for unpaid work performed during the marriage,
or provide for a financially vulnerable spouse. With different tax consequences
depending upon the type of transfer, there is flexibility to structure payments to
minimize tax. Second, divorcing couples with children may (but do not always)
owe child support. Payment for the care of children is only taxed as child support
in limited circumstances. Finally, divorcing parents are given opportunities to
designate who claims children for some tax benefits. For example, a child's personal
tax exemption, and with it the child tax credit, can be transferred between parents,
but the child cannot be transferred for purposes of qualifying for the earned income
tax credit (EITC) and head-of-household status. With respect to each set of rules, for
couples to maximize their collective tax reduction, divorcing spouses must make
rational decisions, sometimes years in advance, regarding their financial positions
and the law that will apply at that future date.
A. Transfers Between Former Spouses
Divorce may trigger two types of transfers between spouses to settle
property and any ongoing support obligation.6 First, a spouse may transfer to the
other spouse some amount of the property accumulated during the marriage that is
either held in one spouse's name orjointly owned. Equal divisions of accumulated
property are endorsed, at least in theory, in all the states, but debates remain over
what should be considered accumulated property to be divided, particularly whether
increased earning capacity is property that should be split.7 Second, one spouse
may be obligated to make payments going forward to help support the other spouse,
generally based on the recipient's need and the payer's ability to pay. State family
law may require these payments of alimony, but the requirement has fallen out of
favor. These two different types of payments have different tax consequences under
current law, although it is relatively easy for wealthier couples to color payments as
one or the other if divorcing spouses choose to do so.
Currently, the federal government taxes property settlements between
divorcing spouses the same way it taxes tax-free gifts, hence no current taxation. 9
Neither the payer nor the recipient owes tax on the transfer; however, the recipient
takes the payer's basis in the property and, generally, that basis is used to calculate
the recipient's tax gain or loss when the recipient disposes of the property. 10 In other
words, federal law defers taxation on property settlements, but any built-in tax
gain or loss as of the transfer may be taxed later to the recipient when the recipient
sells or otherwise disposes of the transferred property. This provision's greatest
impact is on transfers of appreciated property (for example, the family's investment
portfolio) because of the tax benefit of deferral. This provision has no effect on
transfers of cash or property that has neither appreciated nor depreciated; the payer
spouse (or the couple) has already been taxed on that cash or property. "
This favorable tax deferral was not always available. Before 1984, the Code
had no rules for this circumstance. The Supreme Court, in United States v. Davis,
6. These transfers have different theoretical justifications, which are beyond the purview of
federal income taxation.
7. Carolyn J. Frantz & Hanoch Dagan, Properties of Marriage, 104 COLUM. L. REv. 75,
100-01, 106-12 (2004). This is made more complicated nationally because nine states are
community property and the other states are common law.
8. Id. at 119.
9. I.R.C. § 1041(a)-(b) (2012).
10. I.R.C. § 1001(e)(1) (2012).
11. The recipient spouse could be taxed as receiving income. See infra Part III.
ruled that transfers of property as a result of divorce were realization events that
required the payer to recognize any appreciation in the transferred property.12 The
recipient spouse owed no tax on the transfer on the theory she traded a right to marital
support for the transferred property. As a result of Davis, if a recipient spouse did
not have a state property interest in transferred appreciated property, the transfer
was a taxable event to the payer, generally the wealthier spouse.13 One potential
side effect of the Davis rule was a liquidity problem for payers who transferred
significant amounts of appreciated property. On the other hand, recipient spouses
often had a larger basis in transferred property so that they would owe less tax if
they later disposed of their new assets. 14
The American Bar Association (ABA) called for the legislative repeal of
Davis, arguing that divorce should not be a taxable event, specifically, not to a
husband as payer or to a wife who marries a wealthy spouse and earns "valuable
support rights." By labeling the Davis result a taxable event, the ABA obscured
the issue-it was not an additional tax, but timing of the tax.15 Only gain would be
taxable, and that gain, if not taxable to the payer at divorce, would likely be taxable
later to the recipient.16
Without floor debate and after only one hearing, Congress reversed Davis
in 1984 as part of major changes to divorce-related taxation.17 Focusing on the
payer, Congress mandated deferral and then taxation to the recipient in order to
prevent "harsh consequences, often placing a tax burden on top of heavy alimony
12. 370 U.S. 65 (1962).
13. Rev. Rul. 81-292, 1981-2 C.B. 158; Rev. Rul. 76-83, 1976-1 C.B. 213; Rev. Rul. 74-
347, 1974-2 C.B. 26.
14. Rev. Rul. 67-221, 1967-2 C.B. 63.
15. Valentine Brookes, Report of the Committee on Domestic Relations Tax Problems, SEC.
TAX'N BULL., July 1996, at 62, 63-66 (1966). The Report noted that overruling Davis means
a wife is taxed on her husband's appreciation because she receives her husband's lower basis.
"Why should she be made to pay tax on the husband's profit?" Id. at 66. No answer has yet
been given.
16. Others have recognized the injustice created by taxing the recipient on appreciation
generated while the property was owned by the payer. E.g., Leon Gabinet, Section 1041: The
High Price of Quick Fix Reform in Taxation oflnterspousal Transfers, 5 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 13,
39 (1986) (worrying that payers will leverage property prior to transfer); C. Garrison Lepow,
Tax Policy for Lovers and Cynics: How Divorce Settlement Became the Last Tax Shelter in
America, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 32, 59 (1986) (proposing equal division of tax liability).
Some scholars dismiss the concern, assuming people "act rationally and take account of obvi-
ous considerations that are economically detrimental to them." Michael Asimow, The Assault
on Tax-Free Divorce: Carryover Basis andAssignment of Income, 44 TAX L. REv. 64, 74
(1988).
17. Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 421, 98 Stat. 494. For a discus-
sion of the political process, see Barb Mattei, 1984 Deficit Reduction Act: Divorce Taxation,
1986 Wisc. L. REv. 177, 194 (1986); Marjorie A. O'Connell, The Domestic Relations Tax
Reform Act: How We Got It and What We Can Do About It, 18 FAM. L.Q. 473, 473 (1985).
and support obligations."18 Although the Senate initially objected to this, it accepted
tax deferral as a political means of limiting further expansions of tax relief upon
divorce.19 Tax reduction for payers thus won the day.
Unlike property settlements that generally conclude at the divorce or
shortly thereafter, alimony implies an ongoing obligation between former spouses.
Recently, state law has limited alimony awards."z For example, Massachusetts
abolished lifetime spousal support, and Texas limits alimony awards to a three-
year maximum period and an amount capped at 20% of a payer's gross income or
$2,500 per month."z Alimony is often further limited by actual payment. Although
definitive data is lacking, research suggests that noncompliance is significantly
over 50%, and thus it is common for payments not to be made at all or for less than
the amount ordered by the court.22
Despite the reality of nonpayment, the Code only provides for payment and
ignores a recipient's empty wallet by failing to grant a loss or bad debt deduction.
The default is that the payer of alimony deducts the amounts actually paid, so
that the payer is not taxed on these amounts, and the recipient pays tax on the
income received. 3 Thus, as with appreciation in property transfers, alimony is only
taxed once to the recipient, but the recipient of alimony does not enjoy transferred
property's deferral.
Not every payment you might think of as alimony-and not even some
labeled alimony-qualify as alimony for tax purposes. Regardless of state law
definitions, six statutory requirements must be met for alimony tax treatment.2 4
First, payments must be in cash. Second, payments must be made "under a divorce
18. Tax Law Simplification and Improvement Act of 1983: Hearing on H.R. 3475 Before
the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 98th Cong. 152 (1983) [hereinafter Hearing on H.R. 3475]
(statement of Ronald Perlman, Deputy Assistant Secretary (Tax Policy), Department of the
Treasury). The House of Representatives also worried that expecting the payer to pay the tax
opened the system to abuse because the IRS may not be alerted to the transfer until after the
statute of limitations as to the payer had lapsed. H.R. REP. 98-861, at 1116 (1984); H.R. REP. 98-
432, at 191 (1984). There was no mention in the congressional record of the ABA's argument
that the person who consumes the income should pay tax on it. ABA DoMESTIc RELATIONS TAX
SIMPLIFICATION TASK FORCE, THE "INCOME SHIFTING" PRINCIPLE IN PROPOSALS FOR SIMPLIFICATION OF
DOMESTIC RELATIONS TAX LAW 1, 4 (1983) [hereinafter "INCOME SHIFTING"].
19. See Mattei, supra note 17, at 193 n.120.
20. See Judith G. McMullen, Alimony: What Social Science and Popular Culture Tell Us
About Women, Guilt, and Spousal Support After Divorce, 19 DuKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 41,
47 (2011).
21. Alicia Brokars Kelly, Actualizing Intimate Partnership Theory, 50 FAN. CT. REV. 258,
265 (2012); Jennifer Levitz, Massachusetts Sets Limits on Alimony, WALL STREET J., Sept. 27,
2011, available at National Newspapers Core.
22. Constance L. Shehan, Felix M. Berardo, Erica Owens & Donna H. Berardo, Alimony:
An Anomaly in Family Social Science, 51 FA. REL. 308, 312 (2002).
23. I.R.C. §§ 71, 215 (2012).
24. I.R.C. § 71.
or separation instrument." Third, the payer and recipient must not be members of
the same household at the time of the payment. Fourth, payments must terminate
upon the death of the recipient. Fifth, the payments must not be taxed as child
support, as discussed in the next Part. Finally, parties must not have opted out of
alimony treatment.25
Determining whether a particular arrangement between divorcing spouses
satisfies these requirements may require litigation. Sometimes the law is stretched
to produce a common sense result and, at other times, the technicalities of the law
belie common sense. For example, in one case a husband paid his wife $215,000 at
their divorce agreement's signing. 26 The husband deducted the payment as alimony,
and the wife excluded it as a property settlement, clearly an improper tax result
with no one paying tax on the income.27 In order to tax what looked like a property
settlement as a property settlement, the Tax Court denied the husband the deduction
because the legal obligation did not terminate if the wife died between the signing
of the agreement and the payment, even though they happened at the same meeting.
In other cases, courts have relied on the same requirement to hold that payments
for the other spouse's medical bills or car repairs, which appear on their face to be
support payments, are taxable as property settlements because neither the law nor the
agreement stopped the payments if the recipient died.28 If termination of a payment
is not laid out in the agreement, courts defer to state law for whether the obligation
survives the recipient's death, even though state legislatures were unlikely to have
considered the tax ramifications when enacting these family property laws.
Alimony's last requirement permits a divorcing couple to agree that the
payer owes the tax and the recipient receives payments tax-free. No one maintains
records as to the frequency of this election, but based on the limited litigation and
guidance issued, it does not appear this option is used often: there are only
25. Id.
26. Webb v. Comm'r, 60 T.C.M. (CCH) 1024 (1990).
27. Clear-cut rules are necessary to protect government revenue. The alternative is that tax-
payers will game the system. See Cook v. Comm'r, 80 T.C. 512 (1983), aff'dmem., 742 F.2d
1431 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding not taxable to husband on transfer); Cook v. United States, 904
F.2d 107 (1st Cir. 1990) (holding wife receives stepped-up basis and that the Second Circuit
was incorrect).
28. Preston v. Comm'r, 209 F.3d 1281, 1285 (11th Cir. 2000); Hoover v. Comm'r, 69
T.C.M. (CCH) 2466 (1995). One alternative would be for courts to read that the expense
creating the obligation must occur before the death of the recipient spouse, but precedent has
likely precluded that reading.
twelve cases and four Treasury Department rulings on point.29 Nevertheless, some
recipient spouses would be wise to use this alternate treatment because more than
tax on the income may be at stake. For example, tax receipt of alimony can affect
whether a recipient is entitled to the child tax credit, the EITC, and other deductions
and credits that are capped by the claimant's taxable income. By increasing the
recipient's income, alimony might cause some recipients to lose these valuable tax
benefits when they would not be lost if the payer had agreed to pay the tax.
The current default, much less its electivity, was not always the law. In
Gould v. Gould, the Supreme Court decided the taxation of alimony in terms of
property law, not tax law.3" Based on a narrower reading of income than is used
today, alimony was determined to be part of the husband's income, to which the
wife had an equitable right.31 Therefore, the husband owed tax on alimony paid but
the wife did not owe tax on the alimony she received because it was, in a sense,
already hers. The Revenue Act of 1942 overruled Gould, which made the recipient
taxable on alimony and gave the payer a deduction.32 Congress's stated objective
was to relieve payers of hardship from the high World War II tax rates, when top
marginal rates reached 90%. 3 Congress was concerned that "in many cases the
husband would not have sufficient income left after paying alimony to meet his
income tax obligations. 34 The 1942 change was to "correct this situation" and
29. Richardson v. Comm'r, 70 T.C.M. (CCH) 1390 (2012); Linzy v. Comm'r, 102 T.C.M.
(CCH) 482 (2011); Proctor v. Comm'r, 129 T.C. 92 (2007); Simpson v. Comm'r, 86 T.C.M.
(CCH) 470 (2003); Jaffe v. Comm'r, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) 2167 (1999); Medlin v. Comm'r, 76
T.C.M. (CCH) 707 (1998); Ambrose v. Comm'r, 71 T.C.M. (CCH) 2429 (1996); Kouskoutis
v. Comm'r, No. 496-11S, T.C. Summ. Op. 2012-64 (2012) (Westlaw); Shiley v. Comm'r, No.
13418-09S, T.C. Summ. Op. 2011-11 (2011) (Westlaw); Nahhas v. Comm'r, No. 3235-05S,
T.C. Summ. Op. 2007-28 (2007) (Westlaw); Vanarsdall v. Comm'r, No. 7943-04S, T.C.
Summ. Op. 2005-170 (2005) (Westlaw); Tobkin v. Comm'r, No. 6646-O0S, T.C. Summ. Op.
2004-42 (2004) (Westlaw); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2006-38-008 (2006); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul.
2001-41-036 (2001); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 96-10-019 (1996); I.R.S. Non Docketed Serv. Rev.
9303 (1990).
30. 245 U.S. 151 (1917).
31. Id. at 153-54 (citing Audubon v. Shufeldt, 181 U.S. 575, 577 (1901)).
32. Revenue Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-753, § 120(a)-(b), 56 Stat. 798, 816-17.
33. H.R. REP. No. 77-2333, at 46 (1942). See also Revenue Revision of 1942: Hearings
on H.R. 7378 Before the H. Comm. on Ways &Means, 77th Cong. 92 (1942) (statement of
Randolph Paul, Tax Adviser to the Secretary of the Treasury). One theory posits that the 1942
shift of the taxation of alimony but not child support was because obligations to support chil-
dren "might have been considered to be stronger" than obligations to support wives. Deborah
A. Geier, Simplifying and Rationalizing the Federal Income Tax Law Applicable to Transfers
in Divorce, 55 TAx LAW. 363, 372 (2002). Based on Congress's concern that payers would
have insufficient funds after paying alimony, I posit that Congress might have distinguished
child support, which a payer would owe regardless of the divorce because the child would
have demanded similar resources.
34. H.R. REP. No. 77-2333, at 46.
was thus focused solely on the payer.35 In 1984, alimony's tax treatment was made
elective by allowing taxpayers to opt out of the 1942 arrangement.36 With this tax
reduction, the conference report concludes that divorced couples might owe less in
collective taxes than before or during marriage. 3" Nothing is said about who should,
or would, enjoy these savings.
Because the tax treatment of property settlements and alimony differ (either as
a deferral of the tax on transferred property's appreciation, or as a current deduction for
the payer and an inclusion in income by the alimony recipient), spouses are expected
to work together to minimize their collective taxes, as discussed further in Part III.
This expectation exists despite the ABA's assurance in 1966 that "[r]arely, if ever, are
tax shifting purposes dominant in divorces."38 Tax planning upon divorce is also not
unfettered. Congress created a recapture provision that undoes the favorable alimony
taxation if the couple front-loads "alimony" payments in an effort to avoid property
settlement taxation.39 Thus, Congress kept some distinction, and denied complete
flexibility, between alimony and property settlements. This also means the IRS is
left to police the distinction between rules created as a political compromise aimed at
collective tax reduction.
B. Child Support
Over one-quarter of all children living in the United States live in one-parent
households.40 Almost half of these children are entitled to child support.41 Sadly, less
than half of custodial parents receive the full amount of child support they are owed,
and one-quarter do not receive any of the child support to which they are legally
35. Id.
36. Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 422, 98 Stat. 494, 795-97. See
also H.R. REP. No. 98-861, at 1116 (1984) (Conf. Rep.). The House wanted to allow taxpay-
ers to decide, within certain broad limits, who would be taxable on transfers; the Senate Fi-
nance Committee advocated elimination of the alimony deduction. O'Connell, supra note 17,
at 494-97; Mattei, supra note 17, at 193 n. 120. The Finance Committee tried to get women's
groups to support elimination of the alimony deduction, also advocated in Part IV Marjorie
O'Connell, a member of the ABA's Task Force on this issue, met with these groups to urge
them that the deduction allowed payers to meet their spousal support obligation. O'Connell,
supra note 17, at 494-97.
37. H.R. REP. No. 98-432, at 194 (1983). The House approved that "an overall tax sav-
ings generally results because the payer is normally in a higher marginal tax bracket than the
payee." Id.
38. Brookes, supra note 15, at 63.
39. I.R.C. § 22(k) (1942); H.R. REP. No. 98-432, pt. 2, at 1496-98.
40. TIMOTHY GRALL, CENSUS BUREAU, CUSTODIAL MOTHERS AND FATHERS AND THEIR CHILD
SUPPORT: 2011, at 2 (2013). Child support is not contingent upon marriage. Of the 81.7% of
custodial parents who are women, more than one-third have never been married. Id. at 2-4.
41. There are 7.3 million custodial parents who do not have formal or informal agreements
regarding child support. Id. at 5.
entitled.42 This poor record exists despite the median annual child support award
being $4,800, or $400 per month.43 Unlike with property settlements and alimony, the
tax treatment of child support has not changed over the years. Payers of child support
do not receive a deduction for payments to custodial parents, and recipients do not
include child support in their income. Arguably, this creates a disincentive to pay
child support as opposed to alimony, which is tax-advantaged for the payer. In part
in reaction to this tax result, courts and Congress have given divorcing parents some
flexibility in classifying payments as child support or as alimony.44
Congress has long supported the existing tax treatment of child support
because of concerns with the alternative. 45 For parents who share custody of a child,
there is no tax deduction for the costs incurred for the care of the child beyond the
child's personal exemption, the child tax credit, and other credits discussed later in
this Part.46 To grant a privilege to child support would create an economic benefit
for divorced parents compared to joint custodial parents. In order to not create
a new benefit, the payer does not receive a deduction and the recipient does not
include child support payments in income.47
Because of the differences in the tax treatment of child support and alimony
(child support taxed to the payer and alimony taxed to the recipient), questions arise
whether payments are alimony or child support. Periodic payments for the support
of a former wife and child, as opposed to being for the child alone, are taxable
as alimony and not child support. 48 Therefore, family maintenance payments are
taxable to the recipient and deductible by the payer. This favorable rule for payers
is often referred to as the Lester rule, after Commissioner v. Lester, in which the
Supreme Court gave judicial sanction to the minimization of taxable child support
because no part of the case's "family support payment" was "fixed" as child
support.49 The Court reported, "Congress was in effect giving the husband and wife
the power to shift a portion of the tax burdenfrom the wife to the husband by the
42. Id. at 1. Although mothers are more likely to be entitled to child support, mothers and
fathers are equally likely to be behind on their payments. Id. at 9.
43. Id. at 11. Of the amounts actually received, the median is $2,400 annually, or about
$200 per month. Id.
44. In 1984, Congress continued the earlier rule that if a payer is delinquent in payments,
the first amounts paid is attributable to child support rather than alimony. H.R. REP. No. 98-
861, at 1117 (1984).
45. See H.R. REP. No. 77-2333, at 46 (1942); H.R. REP. No. 98-432, at 1494 (1984).
46. The tax system provides no relief in the event of non-payment of child support or
alimony. Rev. Rul. 93-27, 1993-1 C.B. 32; Perry v. Comm'r, 92 T.C. 470 (1989); Swenson v.
Comm'r, 43 T.C. 897 (1965). See also Leandra Lederman, Statutory Speed Bumps: The Role
Third Parties Play in Tax Compliance, 60 STAN. L. REv. 695, 714 (2007).
47. I.R.C. § 71(c)(1) (2012). This treatment presumes the recipient parent does not benefit
from the funds received. If a custodial parent benefits from child support, he or she could
arguably pay taxes on some amount of child support as alimony.
48. S. REP. No. 77-163 1, at 86 (1942).
49. 366 U.S. 299 (1961), aff'g 279 F.2d 354 (1960).
use of a simple provision in the settlement agreement."5 Since the last round of
legislative changes, the Tax Court has ruled that it will not look into unallocated
family support payments to determine how much it should view as child support;51
thus, there is no requirement that any amount be taxable as child support, despite
the presence of children.
When Congress acted in 1984, it expanded the definition of taxable child
support, but not to the extent to abrogate spouses' choice. In conference, Congress
expanded child support to include not only payments "fixed" as child support,
but also payments contingent upon events related to a child, or at a time clearly
associated with such a contingency.52 The expansion makes it more likely that
income is taxed as child support because it is harder for parents to change the
tax consequences without changing their economic arrangement. Whether child
support exists for tax purposes depends on how parents designate and shape their
obligations to each other.53 Throughout the limited congressional discussion, there
was no mention of the welfare of the child or any desire to use the tax system to
improve the child's welfare.
Thus, existing rules regarding payments made for the care of children, as
interpreted by the Supreme Court and the Treasury Department, place great weight
on the labeling and structuring of payments. These rules provide tax-planning
opportunities to divorcing couples to choose their preferred tax result without
necessarily providing greater support for children or the custodial parent.5 4 Despite
the fact that these groups are often in financial need, Congress limited their aid with
this tax reduction.
C. Tax Rates, Deductions, and Credits
All taxpayers must annually calculate the amount of taxes they owe, and
divorced spouses must each file a tax return.55 Filing is often more complicated for
50. Id. at 304 (emphasis added).
51. Simpson v. Comm'r, 78 T.C.M. (CCH) 191 (1999); Lawton v. Comm'r, 78 T.C.M.
(CCH) 153 (1999) (mother's EITC contingent upon child support characterization).
52. I.R.C. § 71(c); H.R. REP. No. 98-861, at 1, 117 (1984) (Conf. Rep.). During congressio-
nal debates over the tax treatment of divorce in 1984, Congress initially ignored child support
to such an extent that the Chair of the ABA Tax Section stated that he presumed Lester to be
retained. Hearing on H.R. 3475, supra note 18, at 210 (statement of M. Bernard Aidinoff,
Chair, Section on Taxation, American Bar Association).
53. For examples of other planning opportunities, see Wendy S. Goffe, Estate Planning
with Trustsfor Divorcing Spouses, 38 FAm. L.Q. 157, 163-64 (2004).
54. States often do not differentiate payments. Judith McMullen & Deborah Oswald, Why
Do We Need a Lawyer?, 12 J. L. & FAMILY STUD. 57 (2010).
55. I.R.C. § 6012 (2012).
divorcing parents because the tax system contains child-based tax benefits.56 First,
the Code provides a personal exemption deduction for qualifying children equal in
amount to an adult's exemption.57 Whoever claims a child's personal exemption is
also entitled to the child tax credit and certain other tax benefits associated with that
child. Second, the Code provides a greater EITC for low-income but wage-earning
custodial parents.58 The size of the credit increases with the number of children,
up to three, that the custodial parent has. Third, the Code allows an unmarried
custodial parent to file as a head of household. Not only does head-of-household
status provide favorable tax rate brackets as compared to individual filers, it also
increases the size of the standard deduction.59 Because some benefits may be
transferred by spousal agreement, the resulting system allows divorcing parents to
maximize their child's tax benefits.
Congress grants divorce-specific flexibility for some, but not all, child-
based benefits, and that flexibility results in complexity for divorcing couples who
try to maximize their tax reduction. The complexity does not exist for non-divorced
parents. For non-divorced parents, the same person must claim all child-based
benefits, so it is an all-or-nothing choice.60 That is not required of divorced parents;
instead, some benefits may be split from the rest. Regardless of divorce, a child
cannot be transferred for either head-of-household status or the EITC calculation
56. In 2004, Congress standardized the definition of "qualifying child" used in each provi-
sion, although not the age requirements the provisions impose. Working Families Tax Relief
Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-311, §201, 118 Stat. 1166. To be a qualifying child, the person
must satisfy a five-prong test. First, the individual must be the "child of the taxpayer;" a
"descendant of such child;" or "a brother, sister, stepbrother, or stepsister of the taxpayer or a
descendant of the sibling." I.R.C. §§ 152(c)(1)(A), (c)(2) (2012). Legally adopted individu-
als are treated as children by blood. § 152(f)(1)(B). Eligible foster children are also included.
§ 152(f)(1)(C). Brothers and sisters include siblings by half-blood. § 152(f)(4). Second, the in-
dividual must have "the same principal place of abode as the taxpayer for more than one-half'
of the year, although as shown infra this requirement is optional for some purposes. I.R.C.
§152(c)(1)(B). Third, the individual must be younger than the taxpayer and either (1) not
yet nineteen years old at the end of the year, or (2) be a "student" who is not yet twenty-four
years old at the end of the year, although some tax provisions impose a younger age require-
ment. I.R.C. § 152(c)(3)(A)(i). There is an exception for individuals who are disabled. I.R.C.
§ 152(c)(3)(B). Fourth, the individual cannot have provided over one-half of her own support
for the year. I.R.C. § 152(c)(1)(D). Finally, the individual must not have filed a joint return for
that year. I.R.C. § 152(c)(1)(E).
57. I.R.C. § 152.
58. Although a discussion is beyond the scope of this Article, eligibility for the EITC is
based on custodial support and not parental status. I.R.C. § 32 (2012). The EITC is available
to those without children, although the credit is significantly smaller. Rev. Proc. 13-15, 2013-
5 I.R.B. § 2.05.
59. I.R.C. §§ 2(a), 63(c) (2012).
60. See I.R.C. § 152. Until 2003, only after divorce could children's personal exemptions
be transferred between parents. Section 152(e) was extended to parents who were not previ-
ously married. King v. Comm'r, 121 T.C. 245 (2003).
unless custody of the child is transferred. These tax benefits depend upon custody,
as do the dependent care credit61 and the health insurance cost credit.62 On the other
hand, in the event of a divorce the custodial parent can relinquish to the other
parent the child's personal exemption, and perhaps unknown to them, the parent
who claims the exemption determines who may claim other tax benefits, such as
the child tax credit, a credit for qualified tuition and related expenses,63 and a credit
for coverage under a qualified health plan.64
Today, a child's personal exemption can be transferred between parents if
the custodial parent signs a written declaration that he or she will not claim the
child as a dependent.6" Thus, a custodial parent may transfer a child's exemption to
the noncustodial parent for any reason and regardless of whether support payments
were made. With the election, divorce overrides the requirement that a qualifying
child reside for more than half of the year with the claiming parent. Congress's
expectation was that this would maximize tax reduction and increase administrative
convenience.66 The Treasury Department noted that when used, support-based tests
for dependency exemptions were heavily litigated, and the House Report agreed
with eliminating support-based tests because of the "subjective and present difficult
problems of proof and substantiation."67 Support was, therefore, deemed to be too
much to require for a child's exemption.
As a result of its transferability, legal confusion exists as to whether a
child's exemption is the parents' tradable property. The Treasury Department does
not permit court orders or separation agreements alone to transfer an exemption for
fear that state courts may allocate exemptions in a manner inconsistent with federal
law.68 Nevertheless, children's personal exemptions are treated as marital assets by
61. I.R.C. § 24 (2012).
62. I.R.C. § 35 (2012).
63. I.R.C. § 25A(f) (2012).
64. I.R.C. § 36B (2012).
65. I.R.C. § 152(e); Treas. Reg. § 1.152-4(e)(1)(ii) (2014).
66. See Hearing on H.R. 3475, supra note 18, at 154 (statement of Ronald Perlman, Deputy
Assistant Secretary (Tax Policy), Department of the Treasury).
67. Id. (stating that support claims composed 20% of the low income tax court cases); H.R.
REP. No. 98-432, at 1497 (1984).
68. H.R. REP. No. 98-432, at 1498; T.D. 9408, 2008-33 I.R.B. 3. The Treasury Department
was concerned that "[d]ivorce decrees, separation agreements, and similar instruments are
complex documents that may be subject to differing interpretations governed by state law.
Allowing these documents to serve as a written declaration creates complexity and uncer-
tainty." T.D. 9408, 2008-33 I.R.B. 3. The ABA agreed. SECTION OF TAXATION, ABA, COMMENTS
CONCERNING PROPOSED REGULATIONS UNDER SECTION 152(E) OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE 5
(Sept. 19, 2007), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/tax/pubpolicy/2007/
070919proposedregsundersecl52e.authcheckdam.pdf. However, one scholar suggests that the
divorce agreement should be sufficient proof of an intent or obligation to shift exemptions.
Robert G. Nassau, How to Split the Tax Baby: What Would Solomon Do?, 61 SYRACUSE L.
REv. 83, 114-16 (2010).
some family courts, as discussed in Part III, to be allocated between parents in the
same way as other accumulated property.
Not all tax benefits relating to qualifying children are transferrable in divorce
and, therefore, severable from custody. The EITC and the head-of-household status
are tied to custody of the child. Despite the custody limitation, maximization of tax
reduction remains a goal of these provisions. For example, with respect to the EITC,
when more than one person can claim a child, the law often demands allocation of
the child to maximize tax reduction.69 If both parents meet the requirements to claim
the child, the child is mandated to be the qualifying child of the parent with whom
the child lived for the longer period of time during the year. If both parents lived
with the child for the same amount of time, the child is mandated the qualifying
child of the parent who had the higher adjusted gross income for the year.7" Thus,
the rules create a default that may require the sharing of information regarding each
spouse's financial position. This default focuses on tax reduction as the goal, rather
than provision for the child.
Only with the head-of-household status does the tax benefit remain with
the custodial parent and with a focus on support for the child. This status provides
favorable tax rates and a larger standard deduction compared to filing as a single
taxpayer.71 The wider tax brackets of head-of-household status results in more
income being taxed at lower tax rates; a larger standard deduction allows more
income not to be taxed.72 To qualify for head-of-household status, a taxpayer must
not be married at the end of the year and must maintain a household that constitutes
the principal place of abode for a qualifying child for more than one-half of the
year.73 This latter requirement requires the taxpayer to furnish over one-half of the
cost of household maintenance, and the child to reside with the person claiming the
status. 4 Head-of-household status cannot be transferred without transferring the
child and the burden of support for that child.
Through the child-based tax provisions, Congress mixes a concern for
children with a desire to grant parents tax reductions. For divorcing parents, there
69. IRS, PUBLICATION 596: EARNED INCOME CREDIT (EIC) 11-14 (Nov. 20, 2013), http://
www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p596.pdf. If a parent and non-parent have lived with a child for at
least six months and one day, thereby each meeting the statute's requirements, the parent can
choose to claim his or her child for purposes of the EITC. Id. at 12.
70. Id. at 12.
71. See I.R.C. §§1, 63(c)(2)(B) (2012).
72. See I.R.C. § 1. Although not all taxpayers claim the standard deduction, the major-
ity of them do. In 2011, 67.6% of taxpayers claimed the standard deduction. See IRS, SOI
TAx STATS-INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURNS PUBLICATION 1304 (COMPLETE REPORT) tbl.A
(2011), http://www.irs.gov/uac/SOI-Tax-Stats-Individual-Income-Tax-Retums-Publica-
tion-1304-%28Complete-Report%29. The choice of standard deduction or itemized deduc-
tions is provided in I.R.C. § 63(a)-(d).
73. I.R.C. § 2(b)(1) (2012).
74. I.R.C. § 2(b)(1)(B); Treas. Reg. § 1.2-2(b)(1) (2013).
are often choices to be made to maximize the reduction. These choices are not
always easy to make.75 Congress cut the tie between a child's personal exemption
and the other benefits tied to that exemption, producing a lack of consistency among
these various provisions. During their divorce, former spouses should allocate the
tax benefits that they can, as they remember the effects of the provisions that cannot
be allocated between them. The choice may change over the years as their financial
situations evolve. Without a crystal ball regarding their own (and their former
spouses') economic futures, transfers of a child's tax benefits upon divorce can trap
even the most wary.
II. PROBLEMATIC PREMISES
This Part examines three premises of the existing tax treatment of divorce-
related events. First, these tax rules, intended to favor taxpayers, adopt a policy of
shifting the tax burden of income from the higher-income spouse to the lower-income
spouse. The objective is to reduce the couple's collective taxes. Second, many of the
rules permit, or require, implicit or explicit elections be made by divorcing spouses
in order to minimize their collective taxes. Those who make the wisest elections owe
less in tax. Third, because Congress has created these special rules for the taxation
of divorce-related events, instead of allowing the general rules of taxation to apply,
marriage is given special recognition denied to other relationships.
Each facet of this tax policy unjustly limits who benefits from the tax
reduction. Shifting the tax burden reduces collective taxes for only some divorcing
couples, and not necessarily those couples who need tax relief the most. Moreover,
especially because divorcing spouses are no longer a functioning couple, the
sharing of any tax benefit between former spouses is not automatically equitable.
Broadening the review of divorce-related taxation to include those couples who
do not benefit from the relief, plus taxpayers not entitled to use these rules, should
cause us to rethink existing law.
A. Tax Shifting
The tax benefit of divorce is most often created because soon-to-be former
spouses shift the tax burden for income from a spouse in a higher tax bracket to
one in a lower tax bracket. This shifting of taxation reduces a couple's collective
taxes. This can be accomplished by shifting taxation of income (as with alimony),
shifting gain following the sale of property (as with some property settlements), or
shifting deductions and credits that offset other income (as with children's personal
exemptions and the child tax credit). This tax shifting may have politically justified
75. See H.R. REP. No. 98-432, at 1499-1500 (1984). The Treasury Department allows both
parents to claim a child for the health care expense deduction and a few other provisions.
I.R.C. § 213(d)(5) (2012); Rev. Proc. 2008-48, 2008-36 I.R.B. 1.
objectives. Nonetheless, as this Part will show, it has practically unjustified results.
When tax shifting generates tax reduction, its mechanics are straightforward.
Consider Abe and Beth who divorce. Abe is expected to have significant amounts of
income taxed in the 39.6% bracket; Beth is in the 10% tax bracket. In their divorce
agreement, Abe agrees to pay Beth $5,000 per month for ten years, taxable as alimony.
If Beth is taxed on the $5,000 payment, she owes $500 per month in taxes, but if
Abe is taxed on the income, he owes $1,980 per month. As a result of the change
in taxpayer for the alimony payment, $1,480 less is going to the government each
month, and that "windfall" can be divided per the spouses' negotiations. Similarly,
if Beth transfers each of their three children's $3,950 personal exemption to Abe,
because of their different tax brackets, a combined $3,507.60 in taxes may be saved.76
Through the shifting of the tax burden, more income remains with the
spouses because less revenue is paid to the government. Without the tax shifting,
Beth would have owed less in tax, but the government would have taken a larger
slice of Abe's income, leaving less to be divided. After the application of the
divorce-related provisions, Beth owes more in taxes, but there is more money left
over-initially Abe's. Thus, the shifting of taxes is often portrayed as an issue of
collective taxes and not who pays the tax. Calculating the tax based on the lower-
income spouse's rates creates the tax savings.
For both primary-earner and relatively equal-earner couples, the results of
divorce without current divorce-related tax provisions would be the same as if the
spouses had never married. Nevertheless, post-divorce tax shifting is accepted,
at least in part, because of the perceived hardship that is caused by increasing
couples' taxes upon divorce.77 On one hand, primary-earner couples' taxes increase
following divorce as a result of the loss of the marriage bonuses: joint filing's
wider tax brackets and a number of other benefits reduce this group's tax relative to
their filing as individuals. These benefits are lost upon divorce for primary-earner
couples: a divorce penalty. On the other hand, two relatively equal-earner couples
do not enjoy the marriage bonus, but suffer higher collective taxes when they
marry than if they filed as individuals: a marriage penalty. Following a divorce, the
two-earner couple has a divorce bonus by eliminating the marriage penalty. It was
distaste for increasing the former's taxes relative to marriage that produced a tax
benefit for this group alone.
Current divorce-related taxation continues the marital tax union for some
couples. Primary-earner couples' alimony payments allow the higher-income
spouse to shift the associated tax burden to the lower-income spouse, extending the
bonus that existed in marriage. The justification for continuing the bonus in divorce
is, effectively, that once these taxpayers have a tax boon, divorce is a bad time to
76. An exemption is worth $395 (or $3,950 times 10%) to Beth but $1,564.20 ($3,950
times 39.6%) to Abe. The difference of $1,169.20 per exemption is saved in collective taxes.
77. For additional information regarding congressional history of alimony, see notes 33
through 37, supra.
take it away. This divorce bonus, and the alimony payments that create it, are less
likely for relatively equal-earner couples, who are more likely to be in the same (or
at least a closer) tax bracket. 8
Tax shifting thus focuses not on the income per se but on the taxation of
that income. "The question presented is not whether income should be shifted from
one spouse or ex-spouse to the other, but whether the income that in fact is shifted
between the parties by local law should or should not be taxed to the recipient."79
Congress, at least in its published reports, missed this important point. By labeling
the gains from divorce as "income shifting," one is less likely to realize the issue
is shifting the tax burden associated with income transferred under family law,
or shifting the ability to claim child-based benefits but without shifting the child.
Thus, the focus should not be on the income or the child, but on who pays the tax.
With little theoretical justification for what is more appropriately called
"tax shifting," the ABA expressed concern that, without it, taxpayers would simply
find other methods to reduce their taxes.8 This concern that taxpayers will seek
other means of tax avoidance could be made any time tax reduction is targeted.
Nevertheless, assigning income to be taxed from lower-bracket taxpayers is
generally prohibited, even though taxpayers have repeatedly found new means to
do so. For example, in Lucas v. Earl,81 the Supreme Court prevented income shifting
via contract from a wage earner to his lower-taxed wife. Similarly, in Helvering v.
Horst,82 the Supreme Court disallowed the transfer of the taxes imposed on interest
payments from the owner of the debt to his lower-taxed son. And much of partnership
tax law has developed in an attempt to prevent partners from shifting income and
deductions among them.83 Despite the general prohibition on tax shifting, in the
divorce context, Congress not only permitted, but also legislated in favor of, this
means of tax reduction.
It is impossible to determine how many couples use these provisions to
reduce their taxes. With respect to transfers of appreciated property, the tax
provisions are favorable to couples who lack liquidity and who understand the time
value of deferring taxation; however, there is not a lot of property that is covered by
78. Among dual income spouses, the wife's income has been found to have a significant
moderate negative impact on the likelihood of an alimony award. Robert Kelly & Greer Fox,
Determinants ofAlimony Awards: An Empirical Test of Current Theories and a Reflection on
Public Policy, 44 SYRACUSE L. REv. 641, 702 (1993).
79. "INCOME SHIFTING", supra note 18, at 5.
80. In 1982, members of Congress, in conjunction with an ABA Task Force, the American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants Tax Divisions, and members of the Treasury Depart-
ment, considered repealing Sections 71 and 215, which permit shifting the tax burden associ-
ated with alimony. Id. at 1-2.
81. 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
82. 311 U.S. 112 (1940).
83. I.R.C. § 704(b) (2012). See also ALAN GUNN & JAMES REPETTI, PARTNERSHIP INCOME
TAXATION 43-45 (2005) (examining the Congressional intent behind revisions to Rule 704).
this rule. In 2010, the median net worth of U.S. families was $77,300.84 This caps
for many the amount of unrealized appreciation that can be deferred in divorce.
Moreover, 25% of Americans had a negative net worth. 5 Of course, couples may
have property encumbered by liabilities, and with married couples' home ownership
rate at almost 80%, it is likely that many divorcing couples have some property to
transfer.86 As for alimony, in 2011, 583,411 returns deducted $10.7 billion paid in
alimony. 7 Much of the deduction benefited wealthy payers of alimony. Although
taxpayers with adjusted gross income of $250,000 or greater represented only a
little more than 11% of the returns claiming the alimony deduction, the amount
they deducted represented more than 3 5% of the total alimony deductions.88 A few
taxpayers have much at stake in their tax shifting arrangements.
But, although all divorcing couples are subject to these tax provisions, only
a subset of couples benefit from tax shifting, and those who may benefit are not
necessarily more worthy. Not only do divorcing couples need sufficient appreciated
property or the income to make alimony payments, the former spouses must be in
different tax brackets or be entitled to different tax benefits so that the burden is
transferred from a higher-taxed to a lower-taxed spouse. If neither spouse owes
tax, there is no benefit to tax shifting. Similarly, if both spouses owe tax but are in
the same tax bracket, there is no tax savings from shifting the tax burden from one
spouse to the other. Hence, the benefit of tax shifting is based on the tax position
of the spouses relative to each other, and not relative to other divorcing couples.89
There are also situations where tax shifting produces higher collective tax
burdens for couples-certainly not what Congress intended. If income is taxable
to a lower-income spouse, that spouse might lose tax benefits, such as the EITC
or dependent care credit, because the increased income pushes the spouse above
income thresholds. What the lower-income spouse suffers in higher taxes and lost
benefits might be greater than what the other spouse saves in taxes.
Similarly, certain tax benefits have little value for some higher-income
taxpayers. For example, personal exemptions are normally more valuable to higher-
bracket taxpayers than lower-bracket taxpayers because their value is the amount
84. Jesse Bricker, Arthur B. Kennickell, Kevin B. Moore & John Sabelhaus, Changes in
U.S. Family Financesfrom 2007 to 2010: Evidence from the Survey of Consumer Finances,
90 FED. RES. BULL. 1, 17 (2012).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 43.
87. IRS, INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURNS 2012: PUBLICATION 1304, at 1, 2 tbl.A, http://www.
irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/12inalcr.pdf.
88. IRS, ALL RETURNS: SOURCES OF INCOME, ADJUSTMENTS, AND TAX ITEMS, BY SIZE OF ADJUSTED
GROSS INCOME, TAX YEAR 2012, at tbl. 1.4, http://www.irs.gov/uac/SOI-Tax-Stats---Individual-
Stafisfical-Tables-by-Size-of-Adjusted-Gross-Income.
89. Men are increasingly the secondary earner within married couples and, therefore, the
effects of tax shifting might soon favor women. RICHARD FRY & D'VERA COHN, PEW RESEARCH
CENTER, WOMEN, MEN AND THE NEW ECONOMICS OF MARRIAGE 1-2 (2010).
of the deduction multiplied by the taxpayer's top marginal tax rate; however,
Congress phases out personal exemptions at higher income levels under the regular
income tax and has eliminated personal exemptions for purposes of the alternative
minimum tax.9" Once exemptions are phased out, they produce no tax reduction
for the taxpayer claiming them. But just because a child's personal exemption has
no value to one parent does not mean it can be allocated to the other; it is simply
wasted. Thus, transferring the tax benefit to the wealthier spouse might result in
no tax savings or even greater taxes owed if the lower income spouse could have
benefited by the exemption.
The same type of tax wastage can occur with child-based tax credits.
Although tax credits reduce the amount of tax owed dollar for dollar and are
generally of equal value to all taxpayers, there are two situations this would not
be the case-one which suggests allocating credits to the higher-income spouse
and one which suggests allocating credits to the lower-income spouse. First, if the
credit is not refundable and one spouse has no tax obligation, credits do not provide
any tax benefit. Consequently, if the sole goal is tax reduction, the better choice is
to allocate nonrefundable credits to the higher-income spouse, who is more likely
to owe some amount of tax.9" Refundable tax credits, on the other hand, provide
some benefit to qualifying recipients without a tax obligation. Certain of these
credits, including the child tax credit, also phase out and, therefore, have limited or
no value for high-income taxpayers. Because of these limitations with the credits
themselves, if the goal is to minimize collective taxes, it may or may not be optimal
for transferable credits to be transferred to a higher-income or lower-income spouse
depending on their relative tax situations.
These complex tax consequences need to be considered in their entirety at
the time of the divorce to engage in effective tax planning, but the consequences are
not always knowable. Consider the settlement of appreciated property: Couples who
transfer appreciated property as part of their property settlement should negotiate
their settlements in anticipation of the taxes imposed on the sale of the property.
To illustrate, a couple jointly owns an investment portfolio worth $100,000 and in
which the couple had invested a principal amount of $50,000. Before the transfer,
the couple has a $50,000 tax basis for determining taxable gain or loss. In the
divorce, the husband transfers his half of the portfolio to the wife. Under Davis,
the husband would be taxed on his $25,000 share of the $50,000 of appreciation
when he transferred his interest in the portfolio. The wife's basis going forward
for determining her tax consequences on a sale of the investment asset would be
$75,000: her share of the original $25,000 investment plus a $50,000 cost basis
from acquiring her husband's half of the portfolio. If the wife sold the investment
portfolio for $100,000, she would owe tax only on her original $25,000 of untaxed
90. I.R.C. §§ 56(b)(1)(E), 151(d)(3) (2012).
91. The transfer to higher-income spouse would result in incomplete use of tax credits if
they phase out at higher income levels or there is another income-based imitation on credits.
appreciation. Under current law, the husband recognizes no gain on the transfer,
and the wife carries over their $50,000 basis.92 If she sells the investment, she owes
tax on all $50,000 of gain.
The investment portfolio is worth less to the wife under current law than
under Davis, but how much less is often unknowable at the time of the divorce. The
appropriate discount off the portfolio's fair market value is the wife's tax rate at the
time of a sale of the asset multiplied by the tax gain that would have been taxed to
her former husband, in this example $25,000. But this gain is not always taxed. If
the wife owns the investment until she dies, any appreciation goes untaxed (at least
under today's tax code). Because of the tax uncertainty, spouses make choices with
potentially significant tax implications with incomplete information, even if they
make tax a top priority in their divorce.
Besides the often impossible knowledge required, this example highlights
another, possibly more troubling aspect of tax shifting under today's Code: Even
when there is collective tax reduction or tax deferral because of tax shifting, nothing
in the law requires that the higher-income spouse compensate the lower-income
spouse for that spouse's increased tax burden. Tax shifting, if effective at tax
reduction, reduces the taxes of the wealthier spouse and increases the taxes of the
lower-income spouse. If spouses recognize this tax result, they may include in their
negotiations offsetting payments from the wealthier spouse to the lower-income
spouse. Some assume the "current-law bias... encourages the payer to make larger
payments than he or she would otherwise make and that leaves the payee with more
after-tax cash than he or she would otherwise have ... However, to the extent
the lower-income spouse is in the weaker negotiating position, possibly with less
awareness of taxes, the tax shifting might be captured by the higher-income spouse.
Studies show that wives are in weak negotiating positions,94 and therefore
are likely to bear the brunt of the tax increase. Despite divorce leaving spouses,
particularly wives, vulnerable,9 5 these women see their taxes increase without a
structural means of demanding a share of the tax reduction. Therefore, it is incorrect
to think of the existing tax benefit as helping women. It helps the collective, which
may, in turn, help a strong negotiator.
92. I.R.C. § 1041 (2012).
93. Geier, supra note 33, at 435.
94. See Catherine T. Kenney, The Power of the Purse: Allocative Systems and Inequality in
Couple Households, 20 GENDER & Soc'y 354 (2006); Amy Kroska, Examining Husband-Wife
Differences in the Meaning of Family Financial Support, 51 Soc. PERSP. 63 (2008); Allen M.
Parkman, Bargaining Over Housework: The Frustrating Situation of Secondary Wage Earn-
ers, 63 Am. J. ECON. & Soc'y 765 (2008).
95. According to the Census Bureau, in 2009, 22% of women who had divorced in the
previous twelve months were in poverty. Some 27% of recently divorced women had less
than $25,000 in annual household income; and 2 3 % of women who divorced in the past
twelve months were more likely to receive public assistance (15% of recently divorced men).
TIMOTHY GRALL, CENSUS BUREAU, CUSTODIAL MOTHERS AND FATHERS AND THEIR CHILD SUPPORT:
2009, at 1 (2011).
This tax planning imposes economic risk on the lower-income spouse
in a divorce for pennies on the dollar in tax savings. Because the benefit of tax
shifting is the difference between the spouses' tax rates, the total amount that can be
saved is limited. Thus, tax shifting for divorcing spouses, with its weak theoretical
justification, poses significant concerns for recipient spouses and custodial parents
as well as the income tax itself. Even if one hopes that it would aid couples
transition to being single, tax shifting is a poor mechanism to accomplish that goal.
As discussed in Part IV, there are other means to address congressional concerns
that raise fewer of the problems created by tax shifting.
B. Explicit and Implicit Elections
Some, but not all, of the tax provisions that affect divorcing couples contain
an election that allows spouses to choose which spouse is taxed on transferred
income or receives the tax benefit provided by a child-based benefit. Some, but not
all, of the elections are explicitly provided in the statute with a default in the event
a couple does not make an election. Other elections are not explicitly provided in
the tax code but are no less available. Instead, these implicit elections involve the
structuring of payments between spouses to adopt or avoid a given classification.
With explicit and implicit elections, couples can choose their preferred tax treatments
as long as they properly structure their divorce or post-divorce transactions, and as
long as they are willing to accept the non-tax ramifications of those choices.
Just because these tax elections exist does not mean that everyone should
or will consider taxation sufficiently important to trump other considerations.
Considerations other than taxation may limit divorcing couples' choices.96 For
example, a spouse might be concerned that maintenance orders (also known as
alimony or support payments) may be adjusted under state family law but property
settlements are unlikely to be afforded the same flexibility. The fact that spouses
have to choose which to sacrifice-a preferred tax result or a preferred family law
result-is troubling but intentional.
One argument given for these explicit and implicit elections is that, "[b]ecause
little revenue is at stake, the parties should be given full power to decide who, between
96. Other scholars have proposed maximizing choice or expanding tax benefits to encour-
age payments between divorced spouses. See Roland L. Hjorth, Divorce, Taxes, and the 1984
Tax Reform Act: An Inadequate Response to an Old Problem, 61 WASH. L. REv. 151, 187
(1986); Laurie L. Malman, Unfinished Reform: The Tax Consequences of Divorce, 61 N.YU.
L. REv. 363, 367 (1986); Wendy Gerzog Shaller, On Public Policy Grounds, a Limited Tax
Credit for Child Support andAlimony, 11 Am. J. TAX POL'Y 321, 337 (1994) (proposing credit
for payer); Laura Bigler, Note, A Change is Needed: The Taxation ofAlimony and Child Sup-
port, 48 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 361, 363 (2000) (proposing to tax alimony and child support to
recipient).
them, should be taxed."97 The idea of choice is appealing, but, as discussed in Part
II, the congressional purpose was not individual autonomy, it was tax reduction.
Favoring choice is also more reasonable when the choice can be meaningfully
made by divorcing couples and with little cost, neither of which is the case with
divorce-related elections.
But first, valuing choice for its own sake assumes there is little value in the
government creating a tax system based on the most accurate definition of taxpayers'
ability to pay taxes. Determining who should pay taxes based on a theoretically
sound standard contributes to a sense of fairness and equity in the system. By
creating elections, Congress confirms that there is no right answer as to who should
owe the tax and, possibly, that no person should owe tax.98 For example, if alimony
should be taxed to the person who controls the income, the election to tax the payer
has no theoretical foundation; if alimony should be taxed to the person who earns
it, there is no justification for taxing the recipient.99 If neither person is theoretically
required to pay the tax, then maybe no one should owe the tax.
For those couples that benefit by maximizing their elections, factors other
than a couple's worthiness for tax reduction determine their tax benefit. Not based
on their ability to pay taxes or on another equitable theory, their reduction is based
on their, and their lawyers', negotiating abilities and the spouses' relative taxable
incomes. Thus, the elections allow well-advised and well-situated couples to
reduce their taxes in violation of general norms of equity that demand that similarly
situated taxpayers be taxed similarly and that those with greater ability to pay taxes
pay more in tax. 100
97. Geier, supra note 33, at 432. The ABA advocated "private ordening," or for taxpayers to
have the choice as to who would pay the tax. See also ABA DOMESTIC RELATIONS TAX SIPLIFI-
CATION TASK FORCE, PRELIMINARY SPECIFICATIONS FOR SIMPLIFICATION OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS TAX
LAW 1, 3-4 (1982) (advocating for "private ordering" or for taxpayers to have the choice as to
who would pay the tax and failing to mention that the tax burden would generally be imposed
on the lower-income recipient spouse).
98. For a discussion of why elections are problematic, see Emily Cauble, Tax Elections:
How to Live With Them if We Can ?Live Without Them, 53 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 421,445-48
(2013); Heather M. Field, Choosing Tax: Explicit Elections as an Element of Design in the
Federal Tax System, 47 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 21, 22-25 (2010); Heather M. Field, Tax Elec-
tions & Private Bargaining, 31 VA. TAX REv. 1, 4-7 (2011) [hereinafter Field, Tax Elections];
George K. Yin, The Taxation of Private Business Enterprises: Some Policy Questions Stimu-
latedby the "Check-the-Box" Regulations, 51 SMU L. REv. 125, 129-31 (1997); Edward
Yorio, The Revocability of Federal Tax Elections, 44 FORDHAM L. REv. 463, 463-65 (1975).
99. Because tax-shifting focuses on collective tax reduction, it disregards the fact that there
might be a theoretically appropriate person to tax for alimony. See Cauble, supra note 98, at
464-65, 472 n.234. The desire to create an optimal default for taxation of alimony payments
also assumes that one spouse will not owe the tax. See, e.g., Field, Tax Elections, supra note
98, at 64-65.
100. James Repetti & Diane Ring, Horizontal Equity Revisited, 13 FLA. TAX REv. 135,
135-36 (2012).
If the only goal of elections in the divorce context is tax reduction, the
elections allow revenue to leak from the revenue system without a sound basis for
the leakage. Leakage of any sort from a theoretically pure tax system is tax avoidance
or, if illegal, tax evasion.1"1 Therefore, these provisions provide congressionally
supported tax avoidance. If divorced couples are encouraged to avoid taxes, should
married couples and single individuals not do the same? In other words, if choosing
tax reduction is good for one group, should it not be good for another?
Moreover, that this method of tax reduction may require wise use of elections
increases the tax system's complexity and means that receipt of this tax relief
is often not automatic. Not only are there risks of higher costs and misallocated
resources with increased complexity,1"2 but divorcing spouses must understand
their choices and, possibly, work together to enjoy the intended tax benefit. Poorly
advised spouses are unlikely to know about the elections or plan effectively. As
many divorce litigants forgo lawyers, and pro se clients, in turn, tend to get less tax
advice, unrepresented couples may be unaware of these tax consequences of their
divorce.103 And not all attorneys advise regarding the tax consequences of divorce.104
One lawyer testified before Congress that, after hiring a divorce attorney, "it is not
usual for a divorcing individual to think they need a tax lawyer."15
Even for those divorcing spouses with knowledge of taxation, these elections
may not be salient.10 6 Taxes may have little salience when a couple is faced with
the other hardships incurred in a divorce, as divorce is one of the more stressful
events a person can face.0 7 In the midst of the trauma of divorce, the impact of the
101. Although we might want couples to equalize their earnings, it is unclear why they
should be given a tax benefit to encourage that objective.
102. See Steven A. Dean, Attractive Complexity: Tax Deregulation, the Check-the-Box
Election, and the Future of Tax Simplification, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 405, 410-11 (2005).
103. McMullen & Oswald, supra note 54, at 63 (citing ABA STANDING COMM. ON THE DE-
LIVERY OF LEGAL SvRvS., RESPONDING TO THE NEEDS OF THE SELF-REPRESENTED DIVORCE LITIGANT
11-12 (1994)).
104. See infra notes 110, 230-31 and accompanying text (addressing counsel's potentially
incomplete knowledge of both tax and divorce law).
105. Hearing on H.R. 3475, supra note 18, at 272 (comments by Marjorie A. O'Connell,
Esq., O'Connell & Associates).
106. For more on salience in taxation, see Brian Galle, Hidden Taxes, 87 WASH. U. L. REv.
59, 63 (2009); David Gainage & Darien Shanske, Three Essays on Tax Salience: Market
Salience and Political Salience, 65 TAX L. REv. 19, 19-20 (2011); Edward J. McCaffery &
Jonathan Baron, Isolation Effects and the Neglect of Indirect Effects of Fiscal Policies, 19 J.
BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 289, 289 (2006); Deborah H. Schenk, Exploiting the Salience Bias
in Designing Taxes, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 253, 255 (2011); Raj Chetty, Adam Looney & Kory
Kroft, Salience and Taxation: Theory and Evidence 1-2 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 13330, 2007).
107. See Paul R. Amato, The Consequences ofDivorcefor Adults and Children, 62 J.
MARRIAGE & FAM. 1269, 1273 (2000); Matthijs Kalmijn & Christiaan WS. Monden, Are the
Negative Effects of Divorce on Well-Being Dependent Upon Marital Quality, 68 J. MARRIAGE
& FAm. 1197, 1197-99 (2006).
couple's choices on their individual taxes may not be intuitive. With the explicit
elections, there is nothing on the tax return that alerts spouses to their right to opt
out of defaults.1"8 Additionally, there is nothing on the tax return about implicit
elections because they depend upon how couples structure their obligations. The
fact that some elections are explicit in the statute might, nonetheless, reinforce the
expectation that divorcing spouses are aware of, and understand, their choices.
Thus, spouses' knowledge of, and ability to optimally use, the explicit and
implicit elections varies. As a result, divorce taxation "continues to generate an
overabundance of confusion and litigation ... an unfortunate and unnecessary
cost to both the government and divorcing couples."1 °9 Some couples likely do
not optimize their tax reduction due to lack of awareness of the rules because
some taxpayers, and, more egregiously, their advisors, do not know the tax
consequences of their choices." 0 On the other hand, many others understand them
well enough to litigate in the hope of favorable outcomes.1 1 Some couples even
plan ahead and request rulings or tax opinions about the tax consequences of their
divorce settlements. 11 2
In the face of an information deficit by some, but not all, divorcing couples,
the flexibility Congress and the ABA value may only add to the difficulty of divorce
and may not produce optimal tax results for many couples. Many people do not
respond well to having many choices.1 3 If divorcing spouses fail to make wise use
of their choices, the current system presents a risk of giving a windfall to payers
(and the well-advised) and a burden to recipients (and the vulnerable).
108. To increase salience, Congress could require a closing of the books tax return for
spouses, as required for short-year businesses after terminations. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6012-
2(a)(2) (2010).
109. Geier, supra note 33, at 409.
110. See, e.g., Pettetv. U.S., No. 7:96-CV-55-F3, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19127, at *18
(E.D.N.C. Nov. 4, 1997) (recounting that the taxpayer, attorney, and accountant testified they
were not familiar with the tax requirements of alimony).
111. See generally Melvin v. Comm'r, 95 T.C.M. (CCH) 1425 (2008), aff'd, 303 Fed.
Appx. 791 (1 1th Cir. 2008) (holding that the petitioner was not entitled to the claimed deduc-
tion for alimony); Burkes v. Comm'r, 75 T.C.M. (CCH) 1772 (1998) (holding that petitioner
was not negligent for reasonably relying on her attorney).
112. For examples of couples requesting rulings and tax opinions in advance of their di-
vorce, see Cunningham v. Comm'r, 68 T.C.M. (CCH) 801, 801 (1994); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul.
126246-11, at 2 (Feb. 10, 2012); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 135343-09, at 1 (June 18, 2010); I.R.S.
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 133 864-09, at 1 (Apr 23, 2010).
113. See PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY PANEL ON FED. TAX REFORM, SIMPLE, FAIR, AND PRO-GROWTH
91 (2005) (arguing taxpayers are paralyzed by savings choices). See generally BARRY
SCHWARTZ, THE PARADOX OF CHOICE: WHY MORE IS LESS (2004) (arguing too much choice can
be paralyzing).
And even within this rubric, not all spouses have a choice about the
allocation of their tax burdens.114 For example, children's personal exemptions
are often considered a family asset."15 Family courts use the elective nature of the
exemption to transform it into tradable property. Not all states do so, but thirty-
five states' courts routinely exercise their power to allocate exemptions, directing
the custodial parent to execute the necessary written declarations to transfer
children's exemptions."16 One could argue that greater marital assets may smooth
the way for other aspects of divorce planning. However, this use of the exemption
fundamentally changes what it is by severing the exemption from the child whose
existence justifies the deduction.
Whether or not judges compel certain choices, to plan properly, spouses
must accurately anticipate both their relative earnings for the period in which the
tax shifting will take place, and changes in the tax law that may be independent
of divorce taxation. Depending on the mood of Congress, the future of people's
earnings may be more predictable than the future of the tax law.
Changes in law are unpredictable in part because Congress may not even
consider important tax changes' impact upon divorce agreements. For example, the
phasing out of benefits may negate tax shifting's savings, but it is unlikely divorced
couples' concerns will be raised in congressional debates on the topic. While the
phaseout of personal exemptions for high-income taxpayers was first applied in
1988,117 the phaseout was itself phased out beginning in 2006,118 eliminated entirely
in 2010, and the phaseout of the phaseout was repealed beginning after 2012, all
114. California uses computer software, DissoMaster, to calculate tax-minimizing alloca-
tions. This black box approach obscures allocations, further divorcing them from any broader
goals than tax reduction, while still not responding to potential changes in circumstance or the
tax law. See Calculate Child Support, CAL. DEPT. CHILD SUPPORT SERVS., http://www.childsup.
ca.gov/Resources/CalculateChildSupport.aspx (May 2, 2015).
115. The National Taxpayer Advocate argues exemptions should only be allocated volun-
tarily. NAT'L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE,, FY 2001 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 109 (Dec. 31, 2001),
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/2001 tas.pdf. Under regulations, if a noncustodial parent is
entitled to an exemption under a divorce agreement and the custodial parent refuses to assign
the exemption, the noncustodial parent can sue in state court over the divorce decree. See,
e.g., Bojarski v. Bojarski, 41 A.3d 544 (Me. 2012); Spencer v. Spencer, No. 30320, 2011 WL
4537845 (Haw. Ct. App. Sept. 30, 2011).
116. NAT'L TAXPAYERADVOCATE, supra note 115, at 110-17.
117. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 103, 100 Stat. 2085.
118. Section 151 (d)(3)(F) provided that the phaseout provision expired on December 31,
2009. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, §
102, 115 Stat. 38. This amendment was scheduled to sunset at the end of 2010. Id. at § 901.
However, Section 101 of the Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job
Creation Act of 2010 extended this sunset until the end of 2012. Tax Relief, Unemployment
Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-312, § 101, 124
Stat. 3298.
without comment on the effect on divorced couples. 119 If a divorce decree is finalized
in a year when a phaseout is not in effect, its tax plan is unlikely to be optimal for
wealthy primary-earner couples under the phaseout. Similarly, if a divorce decree
is finalized when there is a phaseout, the plan is likely not optimal if the phaseout
lapses. In the event that spouses do not accurately anticipate changes in the law, the
couple may suffer higher taxes.
And though knowledge may bring power, flexibility risks generating
taxpayer frustration when taxpayers and their lawyers structure transfers to achieve
particular tax results, but without a willingness to bear all of the burdens of that
structure. For example, for payments to be taxable as alimony, the payments
must terminate at the recipient's death. The implicit election to make a property
settlement qualify as alimony requires inclusion of this feature. Thus, the election
requires the recipient bear the risk that, if the recipient dies, her estate will not
receive the payment. If a couple fails to accept this limitation, as in Rosenthal v.
Commissioner,12 ° it is insufficient for them to claim the payments are "reportable by
Wife and deductible by Husband" as their agreement provided. Incomplete private
ordering may be the worst of all worlds for couples.
There are other costs associated with the elections that divorcing couples
might not recognize. For instance, to elect out of the default property settlement
rules (by selling the property and distributing cash) imposes current taxation on the
payer. Similarly, if a couple explicitly elects out of alimony, the payer must pay the
tax on transfer payments. On the other hand, if there is an implicit election out of
alimony tax treatment, it might be because the couple structures the payments as
child support (in which case the payer is taxed) or as property settlements (in which
case the tax may be deferred). For many, the costs imposed by the choices, required
by the many tradeoffs divorce demands, may be difficult to keep straight.
One cost that is often recognized with divorce-related taxation is
administrative cost. The taxpayer's costs have been discussed above, but no less
troubling are those imposed on the government. For example, in 2010, 47% of
returns with alimony deductions did not match a recipient's return reporting the
income. 121 The Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration analyzed 567,887
returns for 2010 and found a "discrepancy of more than $2.3 billion in deductions
claimed without corresponding income reported." '22 Because of various limitations
imposed by the IRS, only 10,870 of the 266,190 that were identified as having a
discrepancy were examined further. 123
119. From a review of congressional reports. Amenican Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Pub.
L. No. 112-240, § 101(b)(2), 126 Stat. 2316.
120. 70 T.C.M. (CCH) 1614, 1615 (1995).
121. TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, SIGNIFICANT Dis-
CREPANCIES EXIST BETWEEN ALIMONY DEDUCTIONS CLAIMED BY PAYERS AND INCOME REPORTED BY




Addressing the discrepancy over alimony is among the easier administrative
tasks for the IRS with respect to divorce-related taxation. The transfer of child-
based benefits poses greater problems. Despite the requirement that noncustodial
parents must attach a waiver to claim exemptions, the IRS has difficulty enforcing
this requirement, at least initially. Only on audit are the benefits disallowed.124
Audit is triggered if two people claim the same child because of the duplication
of the child's Social Security number. Nonetheless, the first parent to file is likely
to receive the benefits, and any ensuing tax refund, until the audit is complete,
and possibly forever if the spouse who incorrectly receives a refund is judgment-
proof 125 The second parent to claim the child, even if lawfully entitled to do so, is
denied proper deductions and credits until the audit is complete.
Perhaps more troubling from the administrative perspective is sorting out
payments when no one is willing to pay the tax. Much of the litigation over these
payments is the result of neither spouse reporting income and, therefore, neither
spouse paying the taxes due.126 Each claims that either an explicit or implicit
election was made that shields the spouse from the tax obligation.127 It is impossible
to know whether the spouses plan the tax evasion together, or if instead, a single
spouse simply takes the opportunity not to report the income. The results are clear,
however. The IRS continues to confront numerous cases regarding who should owe
tax on transfers incident to divorce. 1
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Because only some divorcing couples are in a position to effectively use
these elections and they often give rise to tax abuse, the flexibility needs to be
removed for all. Instead of creating a system in which well-advised taxpayers
can reduce their collective taxes, and in the process hopefully share the savings
in an equitable way, Congress should dole out its largess in a way that is more
intentionally equitable. Flexibility for its own sake is not a virtue in taxation, and
elections are not without costs. Part IV below proposes a simple tax system that
provides for divorcing couples.
124. Nassau, supra note 68, at 112.
125. Id. at 112 n.138.
126. See supra note 26 and accompanying text; Schutter v. Comm'r, 242 F.3d 390 (10th
Cir. 2000); Richardson v. Comm'r, 125 F3d 551 (7th Cir. 1997); Hoover v. Comm'r, 102 F.3d
842 (6th Cir. 1996); Sa'd v. Comm'r, 104 T.C.M. (CCH) 784 (2012); Murphy v. Comm'r, 71
T.C.M. (CCH) 3144 (1996).
127. Congress is aware of this problem. Hearing on H.R. 3475, supra note 18, at 264
(statement of Marjorie O'Connell, Esq., O'Connell & Associates).
128. The government often sends inconsistent notices to each spouse to protect federal
revenue because one taxpayer will win in court, but this approach risks political backlash.
Richardson, 125 F3d at 553;Murphy, 71 T.C.M. (CCH) at 3144. When the IRS settled for tax
on half of the alimony with the wife, a court held that settled the appropriate tax treatment for
the husband. Christoph v. United States, 919 F. Supp. 1576 (S.D. Ga. 1995).
C. Family Classifications
Through the enactment of divorce-related tax provisions, Congress
determined that terminating a marriage is a sufficiently unique occurrence that
it deserves special tax treatment. Although ceasing to be a partner or shareholder
receives special provision in the Code,129 the termination of most relationships is not
subject to special rules. What is troubling with respect to divorce is that partner and
shareholder statuses are available to everyone; general availability is not the case
with divorce. Only couples (and in thirteen states only heterosexual couples) who
otherwise meet their state's requirements and choose to marry can divorce. The
system treats these relationships differently, and for some couples, favorably. This
differentiation, whether or not economically beneficial to the couples, is problematic.
Special treatment in the tax system provides the government's support for
marriage by easing the burden on couples who leave marriage. As of the 2010 census,
58% of men and 55.2% of women over the age eighteen were married; however, only
48.4% lived in a husband-wife household.13 ° This is an increase from the 2000 census
for marital status, in which the percentage of those over fifteen was about 54.4%;
however, the number of married couples living together has decreased from 51.7%.131
Thus, the valued relationship, the one once seen as the normal relationship, is far from
universal, and it is arguably less normal than it used to be.
For those who are married, there are theoretical problems with extending tax
advantages to the termination of the relationship. Subject to some debate beyond
the scope of this Article, the argument can be made (as I have made elsewhere)
that joint taxation measures a married couple's ability to pay taxes in a way it
does not for most roommates, siblings, or friends.132 Additionally, taxing spouses
as two separate individuals imposes a difficult tracking burden between them.
129. I.R.C. §§ 331, 736 (2012).
130. DAPHNE LOFQUIST, TERRY LUGAILA, MARTIN O'CONNELL & SARAH FELIZ, U.S. CENSUS
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prod/cen20lO/briefs/c2OlObr-14.pdf; U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES: 2012, at 53, tbl.57 (129th ed. 2012), http://www.census.gov/compendia/
statab/2012/tables/12s0057.pdf
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132. Stephanie Hunter McMahon, To Have and to Hold: What Does Love (ofMoney) Have
to Do with Federal Tax Filing?, 11 NEV. L.J. 718 (2011). But see Grace Blumberg, Sexism
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Addressing the GenderedNature of the Tax Law, 13 J.L. & POL. 241, 242 (1997); Pamela B.
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REV. 1, 4 (1980); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Love, Money, and the IRS: Family, Income-Shar-
ing, and the Joint Income Tax Return, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 63, 64 (1993); Shari Motro, A New
"IDo ": Towards aMarriage-Neutral Income Tax, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1509, 1512 (2006); Bea
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The information necessary to know who should be taxed on income may not be
kept but for tax purposes. These justifications for the special treatment of married
couples no longer apply once the marriage has been terminated.
Although one could argue that after divorce former spouses still share
resources, the similarity between married and divorced couples ends there.133 With
the divorce decree, sharing and comingling of funds beyond any legal requirement
presumably ends. Increases in one's wealth generally do not improve the other's
standard of living, and it often requires legal intervention for declines in one's
income to reduce payments.134 Information regarding this legally mandated
sharing is also available in divorce documents, significantly reducing much of the
administrative concern of tracing finances within marriage. Therefore, one person's
wealth may support more than one person, but after divorce, it is less persuasive to
argue that two people function as an economic unit or that administrative problems
prevent the tracking of transfers.
Nonetheless, making divorce trigger tax recognition is an imperfect measure
for the end of economic unity or administrative complexity. However, the federal
tax system's use of a bright-line rule for state-defined marriage makes divorce-
related provisions more administrable, and limits the revenue lost to the federal
government through the tax planning of other couples. Using marriage and divorce
as a proxy, the government does not have to determine who acted like they were
married; it must only consider whether they were once legally married, and that
they no longer are. Moreover, the rule is generally easy to understand because the
status of marriage is a broad one that exists outside of tax. Confusion does exist at
the margins as to when couples are legally married, and therefore when they can
divorce.135 Additionally, not all of those who marry are currently able to divorce,
as some states do not allow those legally married under foreign law to use their
domestic divorce proceedings.136
Relationships whose terminations do not receive special tax assistance are
marginalized by existing tax law that favors marriage. One scholar argues that the
joint return begins with a certain family arrangement as the "only relevant type
of family." '137 That same definition carries through when the Code recognizes the
133. Marital status is an indicator of increased economic position, at least for educated
spouses. FRY & COHN, supra note 89, at 3.
134. See JOHN DEWITT GREGORY, PETER NASH SWISHER & ROBIN FRETWELL WILSON, UNDER-
STANDING FAMimY LAW 374-85, 402-08 (4th ed. 2013).
135. See id. at 36-61; WADLINGTON & O'BRIEN, supra note 5, at 24-31.
136. Tracy A. Thomas, Same-Sex Divorce, 5 CAL. L. REv. CIRCUIT 218 (2014); Judge: Mar-
ried Women Can't Divorce in Alabama, ASSOCIATED PRESS NEWSWIRE, Mar. 12, 2014, avail-
able at Factiva, Doc. No. APRS000020140312ea3cOO2y5; David Crary & Holbrook Mohn,
Divorce is the Latest Gay Rights Battle Facing Same-Sex Partners, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec.
1, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/12/02/in-some-states-gays-fight n 4372851.
html.
137 Anthony C. Infanti, Decentralizing Family, 2010 UTAH L. REv. 605, 606-07 (2010).
termination of only that type of relationship. This division between couples is not based
on equitable principles of taxation, but by marital status under state family law. This
benefit is limited despite concerns raised for unmarried couples, siblings, roommates,
same-sex relationships in states that do not allow same-sex marriage, and more.
The group of taxpayers who are not married is significant. In 2010, single-
person households composed 26.7% of the population, family households headed
by a woman with no husband present were 13.1%, and family households headed
by a man with no wife present were 5.0%. Unmarried-couple households were
6.6% of the population and all other multi-person households were 6.8%.138 The
existence of many different types of relationships, each of which might involve
the transfer of property or support, should make us question the validity of tax
reduction for some individuals in one particular type of relationship.
In particular, there are many types of romantic relationships whose
termination is not governed by divorce-related taxation. For example, although
thirty-seven states (plus the District of Columbia)139 currently recognize same-sex
marriage, in the other thirteen states couples are unable to use the state family law
regime to referee the termination of their relationships. And eight states14 ° have
civil unions or domestic partnerships granting privileges similar to marriage. It is
uncertain how these couples should be taxed. Couples married under common law
principles must file as married,141 but must couples who enter into civil partnerships?
Should it matter if a civil partnership is the only legal relationship granted to same-
sex couples in the state? Do opposite-sex couples who enter into civil partnerships
receive the same tax treatment as same-sex couples? Should the termination of
these other relationships be governed by divorce-related tax rules?
The complications these terminations have in non-tax respects carry over
into their tax treatment. There is currently little statutory provision for post-
termination obligations between same-sex couples in states that do not recognize
same-sex marriage, both with respect to the obligations themselves, and to the tax
treatment thereof 142 The common law of many states requires that among unmarried
couples, whether or not the parties are of the same-sex, a wealthier member provide
palimony to the other following the termination of their relationship if the potential
recipient can meet a high burden of proof regarding the nature of the relationship.
Palimony is an extension of alimony and property division among couples who were
not legally married, but who entered into a similar type of contract. Consequently,
138. LOFQUIST ET AL., supra note 130, at 6.
139. Where State Laws Stand, FREEDOM To MARRY, http://www.freedomtomarry.org/pages/
where-state-laws-stand (Feb. 11, 2015). This area of law remains in a state of flux. In 2015,
the Supreme Court will review the freedom to marry in cases arising in Kentucky, Michigan,
Ohio, and Tennessee. Id.
140. Id. (California, Hawaii, Illinois, Nevada, New Jersey, Oregon, Rhode Island, and
Washington).
141. Rev. Proc. 2013-17, 2013-11 I.R.B. 2.
142. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
lawyers can argue that their clients have rights to accumulated wealth regardless
of who holds legal title to that wealth; however, this lawsuit requires proof of a
private contract that the relationship would be treated with the same legal status as
marriage.143 California first recognized the equitable rights of long-term cohabitants
in Marvin v. Marvin144 in 1976, and most states have followed suit. If unmarried
cohabitants do not prove the contract elements of the lawsuit, most states do not
allow them to avail themselves of state family divorce law. 145
For those terminations that warrant palimony, even though substantively
similar to alimony and property settlements, the payments are not taxed pursuant
to the divorce rules. There are three possible tax treatments for palimony, but the
question of which treatment applies is not well-settled. First, transfers or payments
could be characterized as gifts. In this case, the payer must pay tax when earning
the income used to provide the gift, and is also subject to the gift tax; however, gifts
are excluded from the recipient's income. 146 Because of the favored tax treatment of
recipients, what constitutes a gift for tax purposes has been the subject of litigation.
In Commissioner v. Duberstein, the Supreme Court largely defined gift by reference
to the payer's motives. 147 The Court requires payers give the gift with "detached and
disinterested generosity" in order for the transfer to be excluded from the recipient's
income. A payment proceeds from "a detached and disinterested generosity" if it is
made "out of affection, respect ... or like impulses," only then it is an excludible
gift. 148 Payments for services rendered, or if there is a moral or legal duty motivating
the payment, are not gifts and are not, therefore, excludible from income. Thus,
the determination that these payments are gifts is more likely if there is no legal
obligation to provide them.14 9
143. Patricia A. Cain, Taxing Families Fairly, 48 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 805, 830-31 (2008);
Wendy C. Gerzog, Shapiro: Palimony and the Estate Tax, 131 TAX NOTES 859 (2011).
144. 557 P2d 106, 110 (Cal. 1976).
145. GREGORY ET AL., supra note 134, at 26-27; WADLINGTON & O'BRIEN, supra note 5, at
48-49.
146. I.R.C. §102 (2012). For a discussion of the taxation of gifts, see Joseph M. Dodge,
Beyond Estate and Gift Tax Reform, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1177 (1978); Douglas A. Kahn & Jef-
frey H. Kahn, "Gifts, Gafts, and Gefts "-The Income Tax Definition and Treatment of Private
and Charitable 'Gifts 'and a Principled Policy Justification for the Exclusion of Gifts from
Income, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 441 (2003); William A. Klein, An Enigma in the Federal
Income Tax: The Meaning of the World 'Gift', 48 MINN. L. REv. 215 (1963); Marjorie E. Ko-
rnhauser, The Constitutional Meaning of Income and the Income Taxation of Gifts, 24 CONN.
L. REv. 1, 28-37 (1992).
147. 363 U.S. 278 (1960).
148. Id. at 285.
149. Courts often, but not always, find transfers between unmarried cohabitants were a
gift and subject to the gift tax. See, e.g., Merrill v. Fahs, 324 U.S. 308 (1945); Comm'r v.
Wemyss, 324 U.S. 303 (1945); United States v. Hamis, 942 F.2d 1125 (7th Cir. 1991); Reis
v. Comm'r, 33 T.C. (CCH) 1333 (1974); Pascarelli v. Comm'r, 55 T.C. 1082 (1971). But see,
e.g., Green v. Comm'r, 54 T.C.M. (CCH) 764 (1987) (holding that where a woman sued for
Second, an extra-statutory notion of non-taxable support could allow the
recipient of palimony to exclude any income received on the termination of the
relationship.15 Despite the lack of statutory basis, support receives special tax
treatment in other contexts.151 Similar to the treatment as a gift, support would
require only a single layer of taxation; however, while the payer would owe tax
when earning the income used to provide the support, the payer would not be
subject to the gift tax. Although favorable, this position of excludible support is a
risky one to take. The existing exclusion for support for tax purposes is narrow and,
without congressional sanction, is unlikely to be expanded.
The exclusion for support is limited for numerous reasons: the costs it
imposes on the government, the opportunity it provides for tax gamesmanship, the
fact that the greatest benefit of exclusion goes to higher-income individuals, and the
difficulty of deciding how much of any payment constitutes support.152 One form of
excluded support is child support, and it is excluded without a special code provision
mandating its exclusion.153 Additionally, the IRS has accepted that government
support is excluded from the recipient's income, although Congress reacted to the
exclusion by requiring the inclusion of some government benefits. 154 Enlarging the
support exclusion to include palimony is to risk the problems of exclusion, not only
for palimony itself, but for any newly-created support obligations. To the extent
that society imposes new obligations on taxpayers for support, such as the enforced
compensation, receipt of money was compensation). The courts' focus is on state law. For
example, when one member of an unmarried couple died, the estate argued homemaking ser-
vices were insufficient to support a cohabitation contract. Estate of Shapiro v. United States,
634 F.3d 1055 (9th Cir. 2011). The Ninth Circuit overturned based on its reading of Nevada
contract law (rather than tax theory), which permitted the provision of an estate in return for
homemaking services. Id.
150. See Alice G. Abreu & Richard K. Greenstein, Defining Income, 11 FLA. TAX REV. 295,
299 (2011); Patricia A. Cain, Federal Tax Consequences of Civil Unions, 30 CAP. U. L. REv.
387, 402-03 (2002) (assuming support should be excluded from income).
151. Audubond v. Shufedt, 181 U.S. 575 (1901) (stating that in bankruptcy alimony is
awarded special treatment and not treated as a debt because it is a general obligation of sup-
port).
152. One risk of expanded support is drawing a line around what is excludible support and
what, if any, must be included in income. Rules for defining child support would not necessar-
ily carry over to the adult context.
153. See supra Part I.B.
154. I.R.C. § 86 (2012); I.R.S. Notice 11-14, 2011-11 I.R.B. 544 (excluding certain home-
owner aid from income); I.T. 3194, 1938-1 C.B. 114 (1938) (excluding social security from
income). See Robert W Wood & Richard C. Morris, The General Welfare Exception to Gross
Income, 109 TAx NOTES 203 (2005).
support of elderly parents by their children,155 similar arguments can be made as
those concerning palimony. Instead of this expansion, we should recognize these
legally mandated payments as a source of income for the recipient.
Third, palimony could be taxed to both payer and recipient. Although
the most legally appropriate option, this characterization is politically unlikely
because of the discrepancy in treatment compared to current divorce taxation.
A cornerstone of the federal income tax is that increases in wealth, clearly
realized by the taxpayer, and over which the taxpayer has control, is income
subject to tax unless a specific provision exempts the taxpayer from taxation.156
In Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass, the Supreme Court held that punitive treble
damages awarded under antitrust laws were income to the recipient.157 "The mere
fact that the payments were extracted from the wrongdoers as punishment for
unlawful conduct cannot detract from their character as taxable income to the
recipients." '158 Unless Congress acts, there are "no limitations as to the source of
taxable receipts, nor restrictive labels as to their nature." ' 9
The broad rule of inclusion into income created by Glenshaw Glass applies
even if the income is used to pay a debt. Except in limited circumstances, when
a taxpayer earns income to pay a debt, the taxpayer is taxed on the earnings, and
if a taxpayer uses appreciated property to settle a debt, the taxpayer is taxed on
the appreciation.16 ° Receipt of the payment is also an increase in wealth for the
recipient, so the receipt is also subject to tax. 161
If the Glenshaw Glass theory is adopted, the gain on appreciated
property transferred between former partners would be taxable to the payer, just
as a realization of the gain and receipt of the property would be taxable to the
recipient as increased wealth. Similarly, payments of newly earned income for
ongoing support would be taxable to both payer and recipient. The payer owes
taxes on earning the income and does not receive a deduction for the payment
of a personal obligation; the recipient owes taxes when receiving payment of an
155. Although rarely enforced, twenty states have laws that require adult children to
provide financial support for their parents if their parents cannot afford to take care of them-
selves. Francine Russo, Caring for Aging Parents, TIME (July 22, 2013), http://healthland.
time.com/2013/07/22/caring-for-aging-parents-should-there-be-a-law; see also Shannon
Frank Edelstone, Filial Responsibility: Can the Legal Duty to Support Our Parents Be Ef-
fectively Enforced?, 36 FAm. L.Q. 501 (2002). These filial responsibility laws are generally
limited to necessities, so the recipient would presumably be in a low tax bracket.
156. Comm'rv. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955).
157. For a discussion of Glenshaw Glass, see Joseph M. Dodge, The Story of Glenshaw
Glass: Towards a Modern Concept of Gross Income, in TAX STORIES 15 (Paul L. Caron ed., 2d
ed. 2009).
158. 348 U.S. at 431.
159. Id. at 429-30.
160. I.R.C. § 61 (2012).
161. Id.
obligation owed by the payer."'
Thus, there are three ways that palimony could be taxed. Although the
tax treatment of same-sex couples has received much attention,163 the proper tax
treatment of them as unmarried couples has yet to be resolved. As a practical
matter, transfers are likely to be viewed as gifts or support, if only for political
necessity because of the comparison between palimony payments and those made
upon divorce. However, this extension of tax relief is problematic. In the case
of palimony, tax relief is extended to harmonize the termination of non-marital
relationships with divorce, but without the statutory basis that divorce-related
taxation is built upon. A potential slippery slope of tax reduction may inadvertently
be created when an easier (and more equitable) result is to eliminate the divorce-
based means of reduction.
In addition to the relationships which either have not been formalized as
marriage, or which replicate the marriage relationship outside of state law, other
romantic relationships exist whose termination might warrant taxation similar to the
termination of marriage. Polygamy is unique in that it is considered by its adherents,
but not the law, as marriage.164 Congress first denied recognition to polygamous
marriages in the territories in 1862.165 States have since adopted these prohibitive
laws, although a federal judge decriminalized polygamy in Utah by declaring the
state's law unconstitutional. 166 The termination of a polygamous marriage could,
theoretically, be structured to fit under the divorce-related tax laws, but it would
not be taxed as such unless family law recognized these marriages. 167 Unless and
until that recognition, there is no provision for the termination of these relationships
under state family or federal tax law. Therefore, as with payments between former
same-sex spouses that do not qualify as gifts or as support, both the payer and the
162. The recent U.S. Supreme Court decision in United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675
(2013), provides no guidance for how the Treasury Department must interpret these issues
going forward.
163. See Patricia A. Cain, Heterosexual Privilege and the Internal Revenue Code, 34
U. S.F. L. REv. 465 (2000); Catherine Martin Christopher, Will Filing Status Be Portable? Tax
Implications ofInterstate Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage, 4 PITT. TAX REv. 137 (2007);
Anthony C. Infanti, LGBT Taxpayers: A Collision of "Others ", 13 GEo. J. GENDER & L. 1
(2012); William P Kratzke, The Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) is Bad Income Tax Policy,
35 U. MEM. L. REv. 399 (2005); James M. Plunkett, Rethinking Tax Priorities: Marriage
Neutrality, Children, and Contemporary Families, 78 U. CIN. L. REv. 1409 (2010); Carlton
Smith & Edward Stein, Dealing with DOMA: Federal Non-recognition Complicated States
Income Taxation ofSame-SexRelationships, 24 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 29 (2012); Thomas,
supra note 136.
164. See Samuel D. Brunson, Taxing Polygamy, 91 WASH. U. L. REv. 113 (2013); Lynne
Marie Kohm, Why Marriage is Still the Best Default in Estate Planning Conflicts, 117 PENN
ST. L. REv. 1219 (2013).
165. Morrill Anti-Bigamy Act, ch. 126, 12 Stat. 501 (1862).
166. Brown v. Buhman, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1170 (D. Utah 2013).
167. Brunson, supra note 164.
recipient should be taxed on any payments associated with the termination of a
polygamous relationship.
Similarly, the termination of sexual relationships that resulted in children
may be as worthy of tax reduction as the termination of a marriage, even if the
parents were not a long-term couple. Shari Motro proposes a requirement of
"preglimony" to support mothers in these relationships.168 As yet not adopted by
any state, preglimony is financial assistance by fathers to unmarried women who
conceive in order to equalize fathers' burdens with that of pregnant women.169
Motro proposes a tax treatment for these payments from expectant fathers
to mothers that encourages, but does not require, payments from those "already
predisposed to contribute" to pregnant women.17 This is more like the traditional
income shifting than the tax shifting of divorce because, although the payer is
predisposed to make payments, the income might not otherwise be shifted. Because
these payments would not be required, they would likely be taxed as gifts under
current law, and so they would taxable to the payer but not included in the recipient's
income. 171 In order to encourage these payments with a tax reduction, Motro would
allow the payer to deduct the payments and the recipient to include them in income,
as with alimony today. The problem with this tax reduction is the same problem
as with tax shifting: It benefits only a small group of couples, and ignores that this
savings to the "team" benefits the payer and not the recipient.172 The payer ends up
with a lower tax bill, and the recipient with a higher one.173
If preglimony develops in a way that its recipients use the legal system
to impose and enforce support, required payments to the recipient would likely
lose gift characterization because payments would fail the required "detached
and disinterested generosity" test.174 And, if Motro successfully makes this an
168. Shari Motro, The Price ofPleasure, 104 Nw. U. L. REv. 917 (2010).
169. Id. at 919.
170. Shari Motro, Preglimony, 63 STAN. L. REv. 647, 673 (2011). Motro assumes this
"sidesteps thorny enforcement issues and encourages cooperation rather than conflict." Id. at
672. However, this regime shifts enforcement to the IRS to determine whether payments were
made, whether there was a pregnancy, and whether the recipient reported the income. Motro
omits proof for paternity. Id. at 694. With alimony, Social Security numbers must be included
to reduce fraud. It is unlikely that many in preglimony situations would want to share this
sensitive information.
171. Although I disagree with Motro's argument for treating these payments like a gift
when there is a legal obligation to make payments, I agree with her when the law does not
require payments. See id. at 680-81.
172. Id. at 673, 676. If you "hook" couples on income shifting, what is the political likeli-
hood that it will not be continued post-birth?
173. Motro recognizes that it may encourage "ungenerous" payments and proposes pay-
ments be deductible/includible only over a threshold, in accordance with some measure of
their circumstances, or to require equal shifting. Id. at 693. This does not overcome the prob-
lem that the lower-income recipient has a higher tax burden.
174. Comm'rv. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 285 (1960).
obligation owed to the women themselves,175 the payments should not be taxable
as child support to only one parent. Therefore, unless there is a change in the tax
law, as Motro proposes, these payments would likely be taxed to the payer when
earned, and to the recipient when received. This tax treatment would not produce
the intended benefits of tax shifting upon divorce.
The discrepancy between the tax treatment of the termination of marriage
and the termination of other relationships highlights the problematic nature of
existing tax reduction. Notwithstanding these problems, there is one potential benefit
from the use of a bright-line test to determine whether couples can use the special
divorce-related tax provisions. Groups that are not afforded the same recognition in
the marriage-focused tax law have an obvious example of discrimination to attack:
taxes.176 Moreover, in taxation, these groups have an opponent that many other
Americans love to hate,177 which might, in turn, help these groups achieve other
rights. As was the case in United States v. Windsor,178 which now provides equality
under federal law, it may be possible to leverage benefits gained in the tax realm to
other areas of life.
As long as divorce-related taxation stands as evidence of a favored
relationship, it is evidence of favoritism in the Code. That the tax reduction is only
available to those within the favored group who wisely use implicit or explicit
elections to maximize tax shifting makes the situation no less problematic. The tax
system helps define who is worthy of recognition and who is not. In that process,
these provisions marginalize those not entitled to the benefits. For all of those who
are excluded from special recognition by the tax system, their relationships are
deemed of so little value that their termination is not worthy of aid.
III. PROPOSAL
This Part proposes an alternative to the existing favoritism found in divorce-
related taxation that minimizes the problematic features discussed in Part II. Today,
divorce-related tax reduction is only available to those who make wise use of implicit
and explicit elections (or were lucky), and benefit from tax shifting. Consistent with
175. Motro, supra note 170, at 693. In the surrogacy context, there is debate about whether
payments should be taxed as child support or as compensation. See Bridget Crawford, Taxa-
tion, Pregnancy, and Privacy, 16 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 327, 343-45 (2010).
176. Patricia Cain and Anthony Infanti have both argued that the tax code can be used to
argue that discrimination against same-sex couples is unconstitutional. Cain, supra note 150,
at 406; Anthony C. Infanti, Tax Reform Discourse, 32 VA. TAX REV. 205 (2012).
177. See Scott Clement, America Love/Hate (But Mostly Hate) Relationship with Taxes,
in 7 Charts, WASH. POST (Apr. 15, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/
wp/2014/04/15/americas-lovehate-but-mostly-hate-relationship-with-taxes-in-7-charts/.
178. 33 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). See also Evan Perez, U.S. Expands Legal Benefits, Services
for Same-Sex Marriages, CNN (Feb. 10, 2014), http://edition.cnn.com/2014/02/08/politics/
holder-same-sex-marriage-rights/.
this Symposium's focus, 17 9 I urge Congress to use any tax reduction that is granted
upon divorce to decrease inequality. If aid is to be granted to divorcing spouses, it
should be granted to those spouses who are in greater need as compared to other
taxpayers, and not only because they are in a different tax position vis-a-vis their
former spouse. In the process, this proposal revises the tax treatment of transfers
upon divorce, narrows the opportunity for confusion and tax gamesmanship, and
provides a tax credit to divorced spouses who are in greatest need.
With this proposal, some couples (generally wealthier ones) may find their
collective taxes increased, even as the lower-income spouses' taxes decrease.
Accepting this proposal therefore requires an acceptance that divorce terminates
the link between spouses that the tax system currently recognizes."' Under existing
law, marriage changes the general rule that realized gains are subject to tax: When
spouses transfer property between themselves, the payer is not taxed on any
appreciation in the property and the recipient is not taxed on the receipt. 181 Similarly,
joint filing (with its favorable tax brackets compared to married individuals filing
separately) preempts the shifting of other taxable income by giving spouses an
economic incentive to file as a unit.182 Thus, as a married couple, spouses are
generally considered one unit and not two individuals. This benefit does not exist
for unmarried taxpayers; unmarried individuals are almost always considered
separately for tax purposes.183 The question for divorce-related taxation is: at what
point do spouses lose their tax link so that transactions between them should be
considered as between any other unrelated taxpayers?184 This proposal places that
separation point at divorce.
A. Tax Credit
First, this proposal contains a targeted tax credit for divorcing spouses. As
compared to current law, a tax credit is a better way of reducing the costs of divorce.
To the extent divorce causes unique hardship that is to be addressed by the tax code,
this hardship is unlikely to be limited to couples with unequal incomes.185 Therefore,
a broadly applicable tax credit could aid with the transition from marriage and
179. "Social Equality 'at Home and Abroad' was the theme of the 2014 Indiana Journal
of Law and Social Equality Symposium where this Article was first presented.
180. This Article does not debate whether the linkage for marriage is warranted.
181. I.R.C. § 1041 (2012).
182. I.R.C. § 1 (2012).
183. Sometimes individuals are considered together, for example with attribution rules or
after forming partnerships or corporations. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 11,267, 318, 701 (2012).
184. Many Code provisions continue to treat former spouses as spouses. See I.R.C. §§ 72,
121, 163, 220, 223, 267, 302, 318, 402, 408, 453B, 1361 (2012).
185. One could argue that it adds insult to injury to remove the marriage bonus at the time
of divorce. But the removal of a possibly illegitimate benefit is an inadequate justification for
existing favoritism.
offset the costs of divorce. However, such a broadly applicable credit would have
to be minimal in order to keep its cost down, and it is questionable whether the
public would condone a credit for wealthy spouses. A more politically palatable
alternative is a targeted tax credit for low-income divorcing spouses for a period of
time following divorce.
This Article does not establish an optimal amount of the credit, but argues
for the use of a credit to replace the current tax-shifting method of tax reduction.186
The exact amount of the credit, its refundability, and the period of time for which it
would be available, are not theoretical questions, but political ones.187 The political
discussion should focus on how much assistance is best provided to those in
hardship following divorce.188
The amount of the credit might be calculated to accomplish various
objectives. First, the amount of the credit may provide assistance to offset the
hardship of divorce. Second, if the remainder of this proposal is adopted, Congress
may use the credit to offset taxes owed on payments received from the other spouse
in the divorce. Third, Congress should ensure the tax system as a whole does not
both give and take from low-income spouses through the interaction of multiple
credits. If this divorce-based credit simply replaces another credit that is lost, the
credit would not reduce economic inequality or address divorce-related concerns;
therefore, the amount or structure of the credit should compensate for the loss of
other tax benefits.
To curb abuse of the proposed credit, Congress may limit its availability in
numerous ways. However, because the goal of this proposal is to help low-income
spouses transition out of marriage, both spouses should be entitled to the credit.
This potentially creates a financial benefit for divorce over marriage, but one that
addresses the concerns of divorce-specific hardship. To mitigate abuse, Congress
might limit the credit to one per taxpayer or one per marriage so that taxpayers with
186. Motro suggests a credit to be phased out for couples whose household income drops
as a result of divorce, if the objective is to help mitigate divorce hardship. Motro, supra note
170, at 685.
187. A smaller change requires taxation to the payer per Glenshaw Glass but not to the
recipient, as is currently seen in Chairman David Camp's Ways and Means Committee pro-
posals. See TAX STAFF, HOUSE MAJORITY COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, TAX REFORM ACT OF 2014
DIscusSION DRAFT 25-26, available at http://waysandmeans.house.gov/uploadedfiles/ways_
and-means section bysectionsummary final_022614.pdf. The recipient should report the
income and claim an above-the-line deduction to offset the income to help ensure that income
is not "lost" between the payer and the recipient. That the deduction is above-the-line allows
the recipient to qualify for other tax expenditures based on adjusted gross income.
188. As the credit is not tied to payments between spouses, a spouse might be willing to
let the other spouse forego payment because the government steps in (that is, the government
assumes the role of provider) or the spouse might be willing to take benefits in kind. This
latter problem exists with respect to child support. Daniel L. Hatcher, Child Support Harming
Children, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1029 (2007).
multiple divorces do not benefit more than once by divorcing and remarrying."1 Or
Congress could tie the amount of the credit to the length of the marriage, so that
spouses who have more reason to expect a continuation of the marriage benefit the
most. This political decision should be one that recognizes the inequality currently
plaguing low-income divorcing spouses.
Regardless of the chosen structure, a credit will not be without problems,
but less so than current law. To ensure the proper political accountability of the
credit, it is important that the value and objectives of the credit be understandable
to the public and to recipients. Because taxation of divorcing couples should not be
examined in isolation, but in comparison to other taxpayers, this tax expenditure
must also be made obvious to Congress and the public to ensure the amount of the
tax benefit is periodically reviewed.
B. Property Divisions
Second, this proposal removes existing tax preferences for appreciated
property settlements, which would, in part, fund the credit. To this end, Section
1041 of the Code would be amended. Currently, Section 1041 permits tax deferral
on transfers of property in a divorce and, when the taxation occurs, it is taxed to
the recipient spouse. This produces inequitably higher taxation of lower-income
spouses when appreciated property is transferred. This proposal taxes the spouse
who owned and controlled appreciated property.
To properly tax spouses, this proposal first ends the nonrecognition of gain
for payers on the transfer of accumulated property. Taxation of the payer on any gain,
with a corresponding increase in tax basis for the recipient, prevents the recipient
from paying the tax on income enjoyed by the payer. Under a Glenshaw Glass
conception of income, as discussed in Part II, property divisions should trigger
taxes for the payer because the payer realizes a change in a previously untaxed
increase in wealth.19 ° Thus, under this proposal, the payer would owe tax on his
share of pre-transfer appreciation. To avoid this taxation, spouses could transfer
property prior to divorce, which would empower the lower-income spouse before
divorce. However, to prevent tax avoidance, transfers in the year prior to the signing
of the divorce decree should be presumed to be the result of the divorce, and should
be taxed as such.
Additionally, under this proposal, the receipt of property divisions should
be partially excludible by the recipient. Under a Glenshaw Glass conception of
income, property divisions according to spouses' state law property interests would
not trigger taxes for the recipient to the extent the property division is a return of a
189. As proof of what some couples will do for tax reduction, a couple divorced and remar-
ried repeatedly in order to file as single taxpayers. Boyter v. Comm'r, 668 F.2d 1382 (4th Cir.
1981), rev'g 74 T.C. 989 (1980).
190. I.R.C. § 1001 (2012).
spouse's capital.191 In other words, if the recipient has a property interest and is just
receiving that property interest in the divorce, there is no increase in wealth to be
taxed. However, instead of importing state-defined property interests as the basis
for exclusion, the federal government should permit the transfer of a couple's assets
(whether separate or marital) to allow each spouse to own 50% of the total assets of
either spouse after the divorce without taxation to the recipient.
Consider, for example, a divorce decree that provides the wife with half
the family business that is the couple's (and each spouse's) only asset. If all of
the entity's interests are in the husband's name, under this proposal, the receipt of
half the business interests would not trigger current taxation to the wife, but the
husband would owe tax on appreciation of the transferred shares. 192 This prevents
the recipient spouse from owing the tax on gain that the payer earned and controlled
prior to the divorce.193
For a recipient spouse to exclude the receipt of up to 50% of the couple's
collective property, a divorcing couple must report to the IRS their total value of
property as of the divorce.194 Therefore, to implement this portion of the proposal,
the IRS would require each spouse to file a form with the tax return that is due
immediately after the divorce. Valuations are always problematic to some extent,
but divorce is often a time when valuations are otherwise made for non-tax purposes.
Couples who do not engage in property divisions can ignore this requirement,
although universally mandating the reporting may be helpful to many spouses who
lack financial information at the time of divorce. 19 5
Because the division under this proposal is at 50% of collective property
(rather than basing it on state property interests), this proposal minimizes the
problems created by the different tax treatments of community property and
191. Id.
192. Any appreciation in the family home is unlikely to be taxed. Pursuant to Section 121,
married couples can exclude $500,000 of gain on the sale of their principal residence and un-
married individuals can exclude up to $250,000 of gain. There is a two-year use and residency
requirement for this exclusion and, in some cases, these requirements can be imputed between
divorcing spouses. I.R.C. § 121(d)(2) (2012); Treas. Reg. § 1.121-4(b) (2003).
193. If Congress taxes payers, the recipient should receive a fair market basis in the proper-
ty on a theory similar to contributions to corporations: when the shareholder pays the tax, the
corporation does not owe the tax a second time. I.R.C. § 362 (2012). Because the payer pays
the tax as of the transfer, the recipient takes a carryover basis plus the amount of the reported
gain. This theory would need to be codified.
194. Because of administrative concerns, I considered basing property divisions on the
timing of transfers but concluded that this opened the provision to abuse and has less theoreti-
cal justification than one based on a percentage of assets. Because receiving assets soon after
divorce would likely benefit lower income spouses, Congress might combine a timing limit
and a percentage of assets into the definition of property divisions.
195. This proposal decreases reliance on state law. A potential downside is that by ignoring
state property law interests in marital property, the federal tax system may ignore real differ-
ences between spouses.
common law regimes. Under Davis, which recognized gain on property divisions to the
payer, 19 6 couples of the different states received different tax treatments.197 Couples in
community property states, but not common law states, could evenly split their marital
property without triggering taxation because the spouses each own an interest in marital
property. Because this proposal does not tax the recipient on up to 50% of the collective
(and not just the community) property that she receives, this is more generous than
community property law.
Payers residing in community property states may be advantaged under this
proposal because they would not be treated as transferring the half of the community
property that previously belonged to the other spouse under community property law.
This different tax treatment is warranted if there are real differences in property rights;
however, these differences might cause states to adopt quasi-community property laws
creating short-term rights for recipient spouses upon filing for divorce, as six states did
before the enactment of Section 1041.198 To prevent states from gaming the federal tax
system, Congress should require that divorcing spouses maintain control over (not simply
an ownership interest in) property for a significant period (hypothetically a year) prior to
the divorce to permit deferral of taxation. Without the prior transfer of title and control,
the payer should be taxed on any appreciation in transferred property. This would create
a national standard for the federal taxation of property divisions and, in the process, may
encourage married couples to divide property more equally earlier in marriage.
Eliminating Section 1041's tax deferral would revive practical complications
for payers who transfer significant amounts of appreciated property. To alleviate payers'
liquidity problems, they should be permitted to pay the taxes owed on an installment
method if a form reporting the income is filed with the tax return following the finalization
of the divorce. If the form is not properly submitted with the return, the installment method
should not be available, and generally applicable penalties should apply. In this way, the
government encourages the payment of taxes owed on transfers legally required to satisfy
a personal obligation. However, it does so in a way that assists taxpayers in a period of
transition without prioritizing the termination of marriage to the extent the government
does today.1 99
196. United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962).
197. See Karen B. Brown, The Story of Davis: Transfers of Property Pursuant to Divorce,
in TAX STORIES, supra note 157, at 171.
198. Anti-Davis rules were created in Oregon, Illinois, Minnesota, Kansas, Missouri, and
North Carolina. Gabinet, supra note 16, at 14 n. 10.
199. I recognize that practical elements of this plan need additional consideration but are
beyond the scope of this Article. Consider savings plans. If savings plans are within 50% of
the couple's property, any built-in gain would be taxable to the payer and not taxable to the
recipient. If savings plans are not within the 50%, they are taxed as Section 71 payments.
Savings plans that are funded with post-tax dollars (so that the appreciation is not taxed on
dispersal) arguably should not be taxed in either case because the appreciation is never to be
taxed. On the other hand, savings plans that are funded with pre-tax dollars and are taxed on
distribution should be taxed under either case (and in the latter to both spouses) because the
appreciation is taxable.
C. Section 71 Payments
Third, this proposal revises current Section 71 to reflect general tax
principles and, as a result, raises additional funding for the tax credit. Currently
Section 71 provides a default that the recipient spouse owes tax on alimony
payments and the payer claims an above-the-line deduction for those payments."' °
This privileges divorce because the treatment diverges from generally accepted
tax theory by taxing one party to the payments and that is the recipient. Under
the theory of Glenshaw Glass, both parties should owe taxes on these payments,
because each party enjoys an increase in wealth; clearly realized, and over which
the taxpayer has control."0 ' The payer uses the wealth to pay a court-mandated
obligation, and the recipient receives and enjoys the wealth. This proposal adopts
an approach consistent with these generally accepted principles. Coupled with the
tax credit, this revised treatment of family law alimony payments benefits all low-
income divorcing spouses.
For purposes of this proposal, Section 71 payments are not tied to state
law definitions or purposes for payments. Instead, under this proposal, if a spouse
receives more than 50% of the couple's collective property as of the divorce as
a result of the divorce, the excess is taxed as a "Section 71 payment." Thus, this
proposal makes it so that the tax treatment prescribed by Section 71 is no longer
tied to non-tax family law objectives. 202 Consequently, all payments in excess of
property divisions are taxed consistently. Section 71 payments have either not
been taxed prior to the divorce (for example, future earnings) or are more than the
recipient spouse's share of collective property.203
This treatment is consistent with generally applicable tax rules. As discussed
in Part I, a cornerstone of the federal income tax is that increases in wealth-clearly
realized by the taxpayer, and over which the taxpayer has control-are treated
200. I.R.C. § 71 (2012).
201. Comm'rv. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955).
202. Although Congress is bound by state-created interests, it is not bound by state-created
labels. See, e.g., Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106 (1940); Morgan v. Comm'r, 309 U.S. 79
(1940); Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103 (1932); Tyler v. U.S., 281 U.S. 497 (1930); Burk-
Waggoner Oil Ass'n v. Hopkins, 269 U.S. 110 (1925); Hecht v. Malley, 265 U.S. 144 (1924).
But see Blair v. Comm'r, 300 U.S. 5 (1937). Congress (and subsequently the Treasury Depart-
ment) use the imported term of alimony either as shorthand or because they do not value the
distinctions. For example, in 1944, Congress purposefully refused to use "alimony" in the
statute because of differences between states' laws. I.R.C. § 71 (1954). Congress stated in its
reports that it was concerned about the uniform treatment of "amounts paid in the nature or in
lieu of alimony." H.R. REP. No. 77-2333, at 46, 71-72 (1942); S. REP. No. 77-163 1, at 83-85
(1942).
203. I considered calling these "excess payments" because they are in excess of accumu-
lated property but was concerned that the term might discourage the award of, or negotiation
for, these amounts. Malman, supra note 96, at 390-91 (discussing three options of taxation-
both, recipient, or payer-but rejecting what she sees as "double taxation").
as income subject to tax, unless a specific provision exempts the taxpayer from
taxation.2"4 This is true even when the increase in wealth is used to pay a debt
or satisfy an obligation. Therefore, the payer is taxed on ordinary income when
earned income is paid to the recipient, or when any built-in appreciation in property
is transferred to the recipient. The payer does not receive a deduction for these
payments, because the payments are a personal expense that is not deductible without
special congressional action, and this proposal removes the existing deduction. The
recipient is also taxed on receipt of the payments because the payments represent
an increase in the recipient's wealth. Recipients are currently taxed this way if the
payer pays alimony while both of the former spouses continue to live in a single
household, a tax arrangement which has been publicized in the news.2"5
By making the tax treatment of property divisions and Section 71 payments
conditioned upon tax principles rather than state family law objectives, some current
tax complications for alimony are eliminated. No longer is the form of payment
critical to its tax treatment. The form of payment as either property divisions or
Section 71 payments (whether as a lump sum or as periodic payments) does not
matter from the tax perspective, because taxation is made dependent upon whether
the amounts are representative of previously taxed amounts.2"6 Form generally only
has meaning in tax if(1) a tax benefit is made contingent upon the form of payment
or (2) it is necessary for the administration of the tax system.2"7 Neither of these
need apply in the divorce context.
It is important to note that because Section 71 payments are taxed to both
parties, additional government revenue is raised during a time of distress for the
taxpayers involved. Under this proposal, the increase in taxation is offset by a tax
credit for low-income, but not all, divorcing taxpayers. This eliminates one benefit
of marriage that only exists for some married couples. Same-sex couples who
cannot marry, and others who are not in the favored marital group, have long been
paying this second layer of tax, unless their transfers are recognized as gifts.20 8
204. Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. at 431.
205. See, e.g., Kerry Hannon, Taxes and Divorce: 6 Tips for Women, FORBES (Mar. 7, 2013),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/nextavenue/2013/03/07/taxes-and-divorce-6-tips-for-women/.;
Alimony: Tax Planning, DIVORCE EDuc. CENTER N.J. (Nov. 19, 2012, 4:36 AM), https://web.
archive.org/web/20121119043605/http://www.decnj.org/articles/Alimony Tax.html (accessed
using the Internet Archive index).
206. It is beyond the scope of this Article to determine whether there should be tracing
requirements or whether it is sufficient for property divisions to be of an equal value.
207. Gregory v Helvering established the doctrine of substance over form, which requires
that taxpayers are bound by the substance of a transaction rather than its legal form. 293 U.S.
465 (1935).
208. Transfers between married spouses and between divorcing spouses are excluded from
the gift tax. I.R.C. §§ 2523, 2516 (2012).
D. Child-Based Benefits
Fourth, this proposal imposes few changes to existing child-related tax benefits.
Current law only taxes payers of child support, and allows children to be "transferred"
for purposes of claiming some, but not all, child-based benefits without transferring
physical custody. This proposal retains the former taxation scheme but removes the
latter elective feature. The goal is to eliminate the transferability that exists for some
child-related tax benefits, while encouraging the payment of child support, as compared
to other forms of support. The result would be significantly more administrable child
support and child-based benefits for both taxpayers and the government.
As is the law today, this proposal taxes child support to the payer because
the payments are for the benefit of his or her own child. This provides certainty
for child support, but payments are likely taxed to the higher-income, support-
paying parent and not the lower-income, support-receiving parent. Although there
are arguments that Glenshaw Glass should require the recipient parent also report
the income when the recipient has the ability to determine how the money is spent,
there is a counterargument that the income does not increase the recipient's income,
but instead increases the income of the child. The more convincing argument is
that any alternative would work to increase the economic inequality of low-income
children due child support.
The treatment of child support is more favorable under this proposal (as
compared to Section 71 payments) because child support is only taxed to the payer,
producing a collective tax reduction that is enjoyed by the recipient.2"9 Unlike
under existing law, the reduction is in the hands of the recipient, care-giving spouse
(generally the less wealthy spouse, although not necessarily). This beneficial
treatment creates a potential inequity between those with children and those
without, because only the former enjoy the implicit election to frame payments as
child support rather than as Section 71 payments.
Through its relatively favorable tax treatment, this proposal incentivizes
the expansion of child support, in spite of the pressure today to minimize taxable
child support.21° Moreover, deemphasizing the importance of labels as to tax
consequences, payments should be taxable as child support to the greater of (1) state
minimum guidelines for child support or (2) amounts labeled as child support, and
the termination of which is tied to an event related to the child. The former assists
ill-advised couples who frame payments as family support without differentiating
payments between those for a former spouse and those for a child. To the extent
209. Although there is a benefit for child support as compared to other forms of transfers,
the tax benefit is not as great as simply not paying. This proposal creates no incentive to pay
consistent with current law because it would privilege child support over payment for custo-
dial children.
210. A non-tax preference for child support (rather than alimony) already occurs in family
law.
payments would qualify as child support under state law, payments should be taxed
as such. The latter provision encourages payments to be labeled as child support,
and therefore (hopefully) viewed as such.211
This proposal also advocates for the provision of child-based benefits to
the custodial parent, regardless of which parent provides the child the greatest
amount of financial support.212 In other words, to increase the likelihood that child-
based tax benefits provide for the child, if either parent provides half of the child's
financial support, the custodial parent is entitled to all of the child's tax benefits.213
Thus, even if the noncustodial parent provided all of the child's financial assistance,
that parent would not be entitled to child-based tax benefits. Through this revision,
Congress provides tax aid to the direct benefit of the child, rather than reducing
the economic cost of financial expenditures for the child. Removing current law's
choice as to who receives some child-based benefits may harm parents to the extent
that tax reduction is the goal. Nevertheless, linking child-based tax benefits more
directly to the child furthers the goal of providing for the child.
Complications may exist in the operation of this rule due to shared custody.
If parents are awarded shared physical custody, the tax benefits should be divided
between parents according to the ratio of their custody, as long as the parents,
collectively, would be eligible for these tax benefits. This default eliminates the need
for allocations based on financial support or calculations of actual parenting time.
Prior attempts to allocate children's personal exemptions and related tax
benefits based on financial support were not administrable.214 At different times, the
statute required that a parent contribute a specified amount to a child's care, or at
least relatively more than the other spouse contributed, in order to receive the tax
benefits associated with the child.215 Information deficits pervaded both systems.
As noted by Congress, tests based on the amount of support created problems for
parents and the IRS alike, especially when each parent believed he or she met the
211. The collective tax reduction creates a tax incentive for payment of child support over
Section 71 payments, but only if spouses understand the tax savings. It also creates an incen-
tive for the payer to negotiate to capture some of the savings. That payments must terminate
on an event related to the child imposes a cost on the implicit election to frame payments as
child support rather than as Section 71 payments.
212. If parents debate custody solely to seek a child's tax advantages (for example, exemp-
tion and certain credits), there is a much larger problem in society.
213. If it is now acceptable to sever tax relief from both financial and custodial care of
children, why should Congress limit the ability to transfer to those who are the parents of the
child?
214. H.R. REP. No. 98-861, at 1118 (1984) (Conf. Rep.); H.R. REP. No. 98=432, pt. 2, at
1494 (1984); H.R. REP. No. 77-2333, at 46 (1942).
215. For example, in 1966 a taxpayer could claim a dependent if half of the person's sup-
port was provided by the taxpayer and the person was under nineteen, had less than $600 of
gross income, was the child of the taxpayer, and was a student. I.R.C. §§ 152(a), (e)(1)(B)
(1964).
requirements.216 Angry former spouses often made it difficult to prove who satisfied
the test.217 Similar problems of proof would exist if parents had to provide records
of how many days each retained custody of the child. Therefore, basing entitlement
to benefits on the terms of the divorce agreement is preferred, even if this approach
is not perfect.
Some may object to basing tax consequences on custody agreements,
especially if the agreement does not reflect how custody actually plays out.
However, similar inequity may result from the existing policy of trading benefits,
as discussed in Part II. Moreover, these complaints are more appropriately directed
at a couple's divorce agreement rather than at the tax system. For example, an ex-
spouse may complain that, despite having technically entered into a j oint-custody
arrangement, she alone provides all of the financial assistance for a child, and she
actually maintains sole physical custody. The problem for this spouse is not the
tax consequences of the divorce decree's arrangement-it is the fact that the legal
arrangement does not reflect the reality of her situation. Just because her divorce
agreement is inaccurate does not mean the tax system for everyone should be
changed in a way that would create an equitable result in her case. If anything, the
tax results should encourage family law to create agreements that are accurate.
A proposal that minimizes choice while focusing on custody of the child
reduces tax gamesmanship and centers the tax benefits on the most important
beneficiary-the child. In a world of low child support payment rates,218 this
proposal severs the tax benefit from the collective tax reduction of the parents,
and gives the benefit to the custodial parent. To the extent the system errs, it errs
in favor of the child. The fact that more revenue might go to the government (and
increased government revenue only occurs if the couple would have benefited from
tax shifting) should not prevent Congress from re-focusing the benefit on the person
for whom the system was created.
E. Not a Divorce Penalty
This proposal is premised on the theory that when spouses break the bonds
of marriage, the tax benefits associated with marriage that are enjoyed by some (but
not all) couples should also terminate. If one accepts this theory, this proposal is not
a tax increase for any newly divorcing couple. Instead, for some couples, divorce
is the removal of a tax benefit favoring marriage; for others it is the removal of a
marriage penalty. Regardless, divorce is the termination of special recognition of
the marital relationship, and it puts former spouses on the same terms as if they
216. S. REP. No. 90-488, at 2 (1967).
217. See id. at 2-3. See also Nassau, supra note 68, at 97.
218. See supra note 42.
had not married.219 Nevertheless, despite the fact that divorce is an event that
intentionally breaks the links of marriage, there may be social, economic, and
political reasons to mitigate any tax imposed at the time of the divorce. Under this
theory, any mitigation of tax in the event of a divorce is a tax expenditure and not
required of the tax system.
Despite some current political support for eliminating the deduction for the
payer of alimony,220 taxation of both payer and recipient is likely to be unpopular.
Some critics may claim that it creates unacceptable double taxation, particularly
because the obligation arises from a former marital unit. However, once the marital
bond is broken and former spouses are treated as separate taxpayers, this application
of the tax is the logical result. This harmonizes the tax consequences of Section 71
payments with the payment of any other debt. Additionally, this increased taxation
may work to decrease inequality within marriage. The possibility of taxation to
both spouses upon divorce may motivate some couples to divide property before
the relationship's termination, and therefore empower the lower-earning spouse.
Not everyone will agree with the interpretation of Glenshaw Glass as often
requiring taxation to both spouses.221 Although there is unlikely to be debate as to
the taxation of the payer, there is likely to be some reluctance to accept taxation of
the recipient. In a different context, one scholar has argued that all noncommercial
activities should be exempt from tax.222 By extension, the recipient of transfers
from former spouses would not be taxed because the activity is not commercial.
Another argument against taxing the recipient can be made on general public policy
grounds. The difficulty with this exclusion is similar to those discussed in Part II:
exclusion is a large tax benefit, not tied to need or ability to pay, that advantages
divorce and therefore marriage.
Certain characterizations of a transfer resulting from divorce, either as
a detached-and-disinterested gift or as support, would provide a narrower basis
for exclusion. To the extent payments' tax treatment is dependent upon their
characterization, the system invites litigation and gamesmanship because, without a
219. One could argue we should adopt a standard that relates the tax treatment of divorce-
related payments back to the original cause of the payments-marriage. However, while that
standard might determine the character of income, it should not also affect the timing of the
income. To allow the prior relationship to defer taxation shifts the taxpayer in addition to
changing the amount and possibly character of that tax.
220. See TAX STAFF, supra note 187. Unlike this Article's proposal, however, the proposal
by the Chair of the House Ways and Means Committee would allow the recipient to exclude
the payments from reported income. Id.
221. For example, Marjorie Kornhauser suggests that based on the theory that marriage is a
partnership, divorce should be taxed as the liquidation of that partnership. Marjorie E. Korn-
hauser, Theory Versus Reality: The Partnership Model ofMarriage in Family and Income Tax
Law, 69 TEMP. L. REv. 1413, 1422-23 (1996).
222. Douglas A. Kahn, Exclusion from Income of Compensation for Services and Pooling
ofLabor Occurring in a Noncommercial Setting, 11 FLA. TAX REv. 683 (2011).
specific basis for exclusion, the default is inclusion as gross income to the recipient.
However, fitting payments within these rigid classifications is difficult, due to the
lack of a 'perfect fit.' Payments received by a recipient are unlikely to be labeled
as compensation because of the unsavoriness of deciding exactly what services
spouses perform. If payments are a gift, they are excludible under Section 102;
however, as discussed in Part II, to the extent there is a court order requiring payment,
these payments do not appear to have the requisite "detached and disinterested
generosity." If payments are legally required support, they might be excluded on
other public policy grounds, as are child support and welfare payments; however,
without a statutory basis, this expansion of support could prove to be a dangerous
slippery slope.
Common justifications for other exclusions from taxable income do not
apply in the divorce context. Many tax provisions defer or eliminate taxation because
taxpayers have a continuity of investment that is not broken in the transaction.223
Divorce, however, intentionally breaks the continuity of a marriage. In divorce, the
purpose of the transfer is to permit spouses to change to a new, different status. Thus,
the rights enjoyed in marriage are not of the same kind as the property received on
divorce.224 Similarly, Congress is not attempting to encourage a particular behavior.
Divorce is unlike the largely untaxed sale of a principal residence because, in the
latter case, Congress desires to encourage the status of home ownership.225 With
property settlements, the tax is not eliminated, but is instead deferred and shifted
between taxpayers to preserve taxation in order to not encourage divorce.
Despite the lack of a theoretical alternative, taxing the recipient of some
portion of property settlements may be disconcerting to some.226 If a recipient does
not previously have a property interest in what she receives in the divorce, the divorce
payment increases her income and that increase in wealth is generally taxable.
Consider a couple, Wilma and Hank, whose only accumulated asset is a business
worth $100,000, in which they are equal owners. Wilma is awarded the business
in the divorce. Wilma had a property interest in one-half of the business before the
divorce. Receipt of that one-half of the business is not taxable to Wilma or Hank. For
the remaining half of the business transferred to Wilma, under this proposal not only
is Hank taxed on any appreciation on its disposition, Wilma is also taxed on receiving
the second half of the business. Wilma is taxed because she is made better off by the
half of the business that she was not otherwise entitled to.227
223. I.R.C. §§ 351, 721, 1031, 1033 (2012).
224. See e.g., I.R.C. § 1031.
225. I.R.C. § 121 (2012).
226. Congress should require a tax filing at divorce estimating property valuation that
might bring tax consequences to divorcing spouses' minds.
227. Although deferral may mitigate the couple's tax pain by decreasing taxes on the payer,
in doing so it puts couples with appreciated assets in a better situation than those with liquid
savings and puts divorcing couples in a better position than other taxpayers.
This taxation of payer and recipient currently applies if the couple had not been
married. Two friends, Fran and Filip, jointly own a business and, after a fight, they
sue each other. A court requires them to terminate joint ownership in their business,
which has appreciated in value. If Fran sells her interest to Filip, Fran has income
equal to any appreciation in her half of the business transferred to Filip. Moreover,
Filip was taxed when he earned the income that he uses to buy Fran's half of the
business. If Fran "gives" her interest to Filip after the lawsuit, she is still taxed on the
appreciation, and Filip has income equal to the value of that half because the transfer
is not a gift per Duberstein.228
Therefore, looking at the recipient as part of a larger group of all taxpayers in
need, this proposal's baseline taxation is necessary to guarantee equal treatment of all
taxpayers. In divorce, spouses with little earning potential may be given more than 50%
of the couple's collective property. The fact that the allocation is made with the hopes
of aiding a spouse in an unfortunate situation does not mean the tax results should be
more beneficial than those extended to other taxpayers. If the recipient spouse stole
the money, won it in a lottery, or found it in a piano, the money would be income and
subject to tax as gross income.229 If the recipient spouse were given a skill at the divorce
settlement to earn money, the earnings would be taxed. The fact that the income is
generated via divorce cannot change the result without unfairly privileging divorced
spouses over other taxpayers. We might wish that there was more marital property so
that poor spouses are relieved of hardship, but providing divorcing spouses greater aid
than that provided to other poor individuals is an inequitable targeting of tax relief
Underlying this proposal is the premise that tax should not drive the framing
of divorce payments, and that tax policy should not be sacrificed simply because
there is a divorce. Following this premise, the tax treatment of divorce-related events
should be evaluated independently of the family law results. It might be "absurd
to think" that we can separate taxation from the social and psychological issues;230
however, the difficulty of the endeavor makes it no less worthy. The alternative is that
valuable tax principles might be lost in favor of state law, without fully appreciating
the sacrifice.23
228. Comm'rv. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278 (1960).
229. Paul v. Comm'r, 64 T.C.M. (CCH) 955 (1992); Treas. Reg. § 1.61-14 (as amended in
1993). See also Cesarini v. United States, 296 F. Supp. 3 (N.D. Ohio 1969).
230. Boris I. Bittker, Federal Income Taxation and the Family, 27 STAN. L. REv. 1389,
1421 (1975).
231. For example, focusing on taxation may cause a divorce agreement, which does not
produce the largest collective tax reduction, to be perceived as a miscarriage of the tax
system. That incorrectly suggests taxation should follow the dictates of state family law. If
the tax rules are created according to fairly applied principles, divorce agreement A produces
tax result A instead of result B because agreement A is not substantively the same as agree-
ment B. If a couple or a family court judge chooses agreement A instead of agreement B, tax
consequences should follow. It is tax-centric or tax-phobic to argue that if tax result A is better
for the couple than tax result B, the court and the couple should choose A instead of B or that
B should be taxed as A because there is greater tax reduction.
This proposal eliminates the existing benefit for tax shifting and the elections
often necessary to produce it. Moreover, it simplifies tax law both for divorcing
couples and the government. In the process, it ensures that those with the greatest
need receive the largest tax reduction. The use of a tax credit strengthens, and
makes obvious, the link between the tax benefit and its intended object. Of course,
not all complexity is eliminated but, with adoption of this proposal, the structure of
choices would work to the benefit of the least advantaged.
CONCLUSION
For much of the history of the income tax, Congress has designated divorce
as an event that deserves tax reduction, and Congress is likely to continue targeted
tax reduction programs for some (but not all) couples in divorce. Because the current
law's tax savings is captured by a relatively small group of divorcing couples, the
benefiting couples and their representatives have an economic incentive to resist
changes to the law. In addition, a widespread sensitivity to the economic need
of many divorced spouses makes it difficult to adopt a system without special
recognition for divorce.
Nevertheless, divorce-related tax provisions that deviate from general
tax policies are a tax expenditure, which can or cannot be targeted to accomplish
its objective. When shaping this tax expenditure, Congress should focus any tax
reduction for divorcing couples on those in need, rather than seeing these provisions
as just another grant of tax reduction, often to wealthy couples. Recasting the issue
highlights the underlying question of whether Congress has created divorce-related
tax rules that address the potential hardships of divorce.
With existing provisions, Congress assumes that divorcing spouses will, and
should, engage in effective tax planning. Existing divorce-related tax provisions
form a complicated set of rules that often require spouses to have knowledge of tax,
work together, and anticipate future income and future changes in the law. These
rules are "difficult for lawyers to apply ... intelligently and even more difficult for
their clients to understand . "..."232 Divorcing couples are advised not to do the tax
planning themselves. It was reported in Forbes that even "your divorce lawyer may
not be competent to address [the relevant] tax rules so you may need a tax advisor.- 233
While some couples can use divorce as a tax reduction tool, many couples may be
harmed by rules that are not intended for their individual circumstances, and some
that could benefit may not have the tools to plan properly.
232. See Hjorth, supra note 96, at 187 (arguing for choice regarding support and nonreal-
ization).
233. Robert W. Wood, How to Make Divorce Less Taxing, FORBES (June 11, 2010, 4:22
PM), http://www.forbes.com/2010/06/1 1/divorce-taxes-alimony-child-support-personal-
finance-robert-wood.html.
This complexity exists because academics and Congress have been too
cute in structuring existing relief They have assumed that all couples benefit by
the existing regime, and that divorce attorneys understand the tax law and can
effectively explain it to divorcing couples in the midst of their divorce. Focusing on
economic need rather than tax reduction demands that tax shifting and elections not
be the basis of divorce-related taxation. Congress creates little benefit for the poor
by giving them flexibility when they do not owe taxes or when they cannot benefit
from a difference in tax rates.
This Article's proposal eliminates underlying flaws of the present system
and, in its place, creates a default recognizable as congressional aid to those in
need. The proposed tax relief targets low-income spouses with a tax credit at the
time of the divorce, and generally applicable law still applies in the divorce context.
Reducing choice and planning opportunities focuses the tax reduction, instead of
allowing it to be grabbed by those who successfully use their choices. Thus, tax
relief is given based on need and not greed.234
234. As a final note, there is nothing mandating that any tax preference be granted upon
divorce. Congress could apply traditional tax policies to all of these payments and provide
any assistance to divorcing couples through more direct means. Not everything has to be done
through the tax code.
